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TESTINIG COlVIPETINIG THEORIES OF 
JUSTIFICATION 
PAUL H . ROBINSON & JOHN M . DARLEY'' 
Nearly every jurisdiction 's criminal law recognizes justification 
defenses, defenses that exculpate a person whose conduct would 
otherwise be criminal beccwse the conduct is accepted or 
encouraged due to special circumstance. While justification 
defenses themselves are nearly universal, there is much 
disagreement over whether the defense is given because a person's 
act avoids a greater harm, the so-called deeds theory, or because 
she acts for the right reason, the so-called reasons theory. At least 
part of this debate focus es upon which theory best reflects 
community intuitions. In this Article, Professors Robinson and 
Darley report the results of an empirical study measuring 
community intuitions regarding justification defenses. They 
conclude that the deeds theory of justification better accords with 
community views than the reasons theory. The study 's results 
suggest, and the authors discuss, a reformulation of many aspects 
of offense definitions, reforms to justification defenses, mitigations 
for mistake as to a justificatio n, and reforms of jury acquittal 
verdicts. Such conclusions illustrate the potential usefulness of 
social science research for resolving issues disputed among 
criminal law theorists, as well as for providing valuable 
information to the drafters of crim.inal codes. Finally, the authors 
argue that reforms arising from such empirical studies increase the 
law's moral credibility, which in turn increases its long-term 
effectiveness in crime control. 
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Justification defenses, such as self-defense and law enforcement 
authority, are common in every jurisdiction . They share the 
characteristic of exculpating a person whose conduct otherwise would 
constitute a criminal offense, because the conduct is accepted or 
encouraged given the presence of special justifying circumstances. 1 
For example, a police officer 's conduct in making an arrest may 
satisfy the requirements of assault, but she is free from liability if that 
conduct also satisfies the requirements of the law enforcement 
1. See generally PAUL H. ROBI NSON , CR IM INA L L AW 401-69 (1997) (d iscussing 
justification defenses in detai l). 
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justification for the use of force. A lost camper who takes food from 
another's cabin may have committed an act that sa tisfie s the elements 
of th e crime of theft, but he is exculpated under a lesser evils 
justification defense if the taking is necessary to preve nt his starving 
to death. 
Justification defenses are dis tinguishabl e frorn e xcuse defenses 
in a fundamental way. Both exculpa te. but for different reasons. An 
actur pleading justification claims to have acted prope rly . t}wt she did 
the right thing. An actor pleading excuse , such as insa nit y. duress, or 
involuntary conduct , admits that vvhat sh e did \vas wro ng. but claims 
that some characteristic or her cond ition leaves her bl c.\meless for the 
offense. 
Despite the universal recognition of justification defenses, there 
is disagreement over the underlying theory of the justificatory 
principle, and thus the proper legal formulation of such defenses. At 
the core of the debate about the principle is the foll owing question : 
Are justification defenses given because the actor 's deed avoids a 
greater harm, or because she acted for the right reason? 
The deeds theory of justification justifies conduct that avoids a 
greater harm, and thus it is conduct that we would be happy to 
tolerate under similar circumstances in th e future. Justified conduct, 
under this theory, occurs when the actor has done the right deed , 
hence , the " deeds" theory of justification. The reasons theory looks 
not to the deed but to the reason for the deed. The reasons theory. 
then, gives a defense when a person acts for the right reason, 
genera lly trying to avoid a greater harm. The issue between the two 
theories concerns the focus of justification. Is the focus of 
justification the nature of the deed, or the actor"s reason for acting? 
The debate to date relies in large part upon legal and 
philosophical arguments.2 But frequently a third source of authority 
is brought into play. Each side buttresses its argum ents with claims 
that its theory better tracks community intuitions/ a common claim 
in criminal law arguments. In this Article we test those claims about 
community intuitions, using policy-capturing social science research 
techniques designed for such inquiries. In the process, we learn 
about community views on the proper theory and formulation of 
justification defenses, as well as other cr iminal law doctrines, and 
2. See, e.g .. Paul H. Robinson , Cornpeting Th eories of Justification: Deeds v. 
Reasons, in HAR!'d AN D CULPABILITY 45 , 47-49 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eels., 
1996) (citing var ious authorities) . 
3. See, e.g. , GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKI NC C Riivl!NAL LAW 556-57 (1978): 2 
PAUL H. ROB INSON, CRiiV!INAL LAW DEFENSES§ l22(e ). at 23-27 (1984). 
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about the value of social science research to criminal law 
fo rmulation. 
I. COMPETING THEORIES OF J USTIFICATION 
In many cases, an actor's conduct will be both obj ective ly and 
subj ec ti vely justified . T he actor be lieves his conduct avoids a greater 
harm and he acts to avoid that greater harm , thereby sa tisfying the: 
reasons t heory , and his conduct does in fact avoid a greater harm. 
there by satisfying the deeds theory. But in many othe r cases , the 
de eds and reasons th eories clash one! give different resu lts. and it is 
these cases of conflict that are the focus of thi s study. 
V/here the reasons theory of justification (sometimes ca ll ed the 
"subj ective" theory) is adopted, the standard justification 
formulation provides that "an actor is justified if he believes that the 
conduct is necessary"'' to defend against unlawful aggressio n. to make 
an arrest, to m aintain order on the vehicle , and so on.5 Und er this 
reasons theory, a person will get a justification defense as long as she 
believes that the justifying circumstances exist. Whether they 
actually exist or not is irrelevant. 
Under a deeds theory (sometimes termed an "objective" 
theory) , the rationale for justification is whether or not the conduct is 
something that we are content to have the actor perform due to the 
justifying circumstances and to have others perform under similar 
circumstances in the future. The test for justification is whether, on 
balance, the conduct in fact avoids a net societal harm (in the 
broadest sense). An actor's reasons may be relevant to liability 
und er other criminal law doctrines: A mistaken reasonable belief 
that the conduct is justified may exculpate under an excuse defense; a 
mistaken belief that the conduct is not justified may inculpate as an 
impossible attempt offense. But an actor's reasons are not relevant 
under the deeds theory in determining whether a justification defense 
is available. 
This, then, is the point of dispute in the theory of justification: Is 
the objectively justified nature of the deed central , as the deeds 
theory would have it, or irrelevant, as the reasons theory suggests? 
Most commentators have signed on in support of the reasons 
theory and in opposition to the deeds theory,6 some suggesting that 
4. MOD EL PENAL CODE§ 3.01 (1985) (emphasis added). 
5. See, e.g., id. §§ 3.01-3.11 (setting forth justification formulations). 
6. See, e.g. , W AYNE R. LAFAVE & A USTIN W. SCOIT, JR ., SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMI NA L L AW 685 (1986) (claiming that in order to have the benefit of justifica tion o ne 
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the latter is "absurd. ''7 unfair,~ or unduly burdensomeY (It is worth 
noting that the first two of these objections are based on the moral 
intuitions of the writers, coup led with their certainty that others share 
their moral intuitions.) Taking the minority side, one of us has 
argued that a deeds theory of justification is better for a variety of 
reasons , including that it generates liability results that are more just 
and that better match our collective intuitions of what is just. 10 
Most, but not alL states appear to follow the reasons theory in 
their criminal Ltvv. 11 although there is often some ambiguity as to 
which theory of justification they actually adopt. des pite the apparent 
clarity of first appearances. 12 T he Model Penal Code formulation is 
quoted above: An actor is justified if she believes that her conduct is 
necessary for defense. 13 
Current English law also appears to adopt the reasons theory. 
Professors Smith and Hogan, for example, conclude that the law " is 
must act for that particular purpose); J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 37 
(8th ed. 1996) (requiring state of mind as well as state of fact for justification to be 
reasonable); Michael Corrado. Nores on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses. 82 J. CR!ivl. 
L & CRIMINOLOCjY 465. 489 ( 1991) (arguing that state of mind is a necessary component 
of justification and that Robinson's proposed externalist perspective is impossible to 
accept); Kent Greenawalt. The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (1984) (recognizing that most modern statutes require a 
subjective belief in justification and that Robinson's fully objective approach is an 
exception). 
7. See Brian Hogan. The Dadson Principle, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 679, 680 ("It seems 
to me absurd to say that I may jusrifv or excuse my conduct, however callous it was in the 
circumstances known to me at the time. by showing that there existed other circumstances 
which, had I but known ol them. would have justified or excused my conduct."), 
8. See Arnold H. Loewy. Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the 
Factors on Which Our Crirninal Law Is Predicated, 66 N,C. L. REV. 283. 289 (1988) 
(arguing that, as a matter of fairness, the issue ought to be one solely of culpability rather 
than result). 
9. See Kevin McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process , 40 
HASTINGS LJ. 957, 978 (1989) ("[A purely objective view of self-defense] is a more 
difficult factual question for the defendant to resolve than the question of her own 
subjective belief since calculation of the harm threatened involves a number of variables 
[that] are beyond the defendant's ability to perceive .... "). 
10. See Robinson, supra note 2. 
ll, See 2 ROBINSON. supra note 3, § 184(b ). at 399-403 (listing state criminal code 
justification sections that include a requirement that the actor "believe" his or her 
conduct is justified). 
12. See Robinson , supra note 2. at 51-54 (noting that the Model Penal Code 
ultimately recognizes the importance of the distinction between a "belief" in a 
justification and actuaL objective justification, when it creates the concepts of 
"privileged" and unprivileged justification). 
13. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE§§ 3.02(1), 3.03(3)(a), 3.04(1), 3.05(l)(b), 3.06(1). 
3.07(1) (1985) (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying note 4 (quoting the 
Model Penal Code formulation). 
1100 N ORTH CAROLINA LAW R EVIEW [Vol. 76 
stated exclusive ly in terms of the ckfenclant's be lief.'' 1'1 citing the 
cases of Gladsrone Yilil!iams . Dodson. and Thain . 15 Section 24 of 
England's Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 appears to be an 
exception to the general rule , for it justifi es an arrest even if the 
officer did not at the time know of or bel ieve in the justifying 
c ircumstances, 16 reflecting a cleecls theory of justification. Cla uses 44 
cmd 185 of the proposed Cri rninal Code for Engbnd and Vvales 
apparentl y wou ld broaden th is exception to rnuke it the general 
rul e .17 Tha t is, they adopt a clc cds theory as the ir general approach . 
T hey provide a justification clefcns<:: i f the actor "uses such force as. 
in the circumstances 1vhiclz e.risi,'. is immediate ly nccessmy and 
reasonable for defense. 1" Inte res tingly , the drafters claim that the 
provision codifies the common law of self-defense and defense of 
another. 19 They concede that it modi fies the common lavv of defense 
of property but argue that this modificat ion is necessary to avoid an 
irrational inconsistency between the rules for the different defensive 
force defenses.20 
The contrasts between the two theories are illuminated when we 
consider how the deeds theory and the reasons theory suggest 
different results at each of the two conflict points: (1) when the actor 
mistakenly believes her conduct is no t justified (the unknowingly 
justified actor); and (2) when the actor mistakenly believes her 
14. SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 6. at 265. 
15. Glads tone Williams, 78 Crim. App. 276 (i 9i'\3) ; Regina v. Dadson. 4 Cox C. C. 358 
(Crim. App. 1850) ; Regina v. Thain , l985 N. lr. 457 (C.A.). 
16. Police and Criminal Evidence Act. 1984. ch. 24. ~ 4(a) (E ng.) (providing that an 
actor may arrest without a warrant ··anyone who is in the act of committing an arrcstab!e 
offence"): id. § 5(a) (providing that an actor ma y arrest without a warrant '·anyone wh o is 
guilty of the offence"): id. § 7(a) (p roviding th at an actor may arrest without a warrant 
'"anyone who is about to commit an arrestable offence"). 
17. See 1 A CRIMINAL C ODE FOR ENGLAN D AND W A L ES cis. 44, 185 (Law 
Commission, Report and Draft Criminal Code Bi111 989). 
LS. 1 id. (emphasis added) . These same proposed code provisions also allow a 
defense if the actor uses such force as. ·' in th e circumstances ... which he believes to 
exisr,'· is immediately necessa ry and reasonable for defense. 1 id. (emphasis added) The 
use of this "believes" language does not make the provis ion one based upon a reasons 
theory of justification , for it still allows a justification without req uiring proof of a belief in 
the justifying circumstances. The effect of such language is to aii O\v a defense either upon 
actu al or believed justifying circumstances. Nothing in the deeds theory prohibits a 
defense for mistake as to a justifi c ~ltion. On the contrary. it assumes th at such a defense 
wi ll be provided but wi ll be unders tood to be an excuse . Note that th e provision of the 
proposed code does not identify eith er defense as a justification or an excuse. 
19. The drafters explain : " [I]f his defence is th at he was defending his person. or that 
of another. the test at common law is whether what he did was reasonable'' 2 id. 9l 12.25, 
at 231 (emphasis added). 
20. See 2 id. 
., 
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conduct is justifi ed (mistake as to a justificat ion) . 
The Un knmving!y Justified Acror 
Assume a person's conduct is obj ective ly justi fi ed but he does 
not realize this: he mistakenly believes it is unjustified. For exa mple, 
the pe rson mugs a jogger, only to fi nd o ut that the victim was a club-
wie lding attack er. \Vh et her the beating of th e attacker-thought-to-
be -a-jogge r is justified depends on whethe r it is the q ual ity of the 
deed or the act or's reasons for it th at provide the rationale for 
justification defenses. 
Under the deeds theory, when the perso n· ~, conduct in fa ct 
avoids a greater societal harm but the person is unaware of thi s, the 
co nduct is justified despite the acto r 's ignoran ce. However, the 
person 's be lief that the conduct is not justified will give rise to 
attempt li ability (assuming the jurisdiction punishes legally 
impossible a ttempts, as most do21). Thus. the use of force against the 
attacker-thought-to-be-a-jogger is justified and the acto r will have a 
defense to the substantive offense for assault. but the actor will be 
liable for an attempted assault. A ttempt is an offense that exists to 
punish just such manifested intention to commit an offense , when the 
harm or evil of the offe nse does not in fact occur , and presents a 
situation analogous to that of the unknowingly justified actor , who 
has manifested an intention to act unjustifiably , but in fact no net 
societal harm has occurred. 
Under the reasons theory, if the justifying ci rcumstances exist 
but the ac tor is unaware of them and acts for a different purpose, a 
justification defense is denied . If what matters is the reason for the 
deed , not the deed itself, the for ce used against the attacker-thought-
to-be-a-j ogger is not justified. While it might have been the right 
deed, necessary for self-defense, it was for the wrong reason. 
B . lvlistake as to a Justification 
More common is the reve rse case: A person 's conduct is 
objectively unjustified but the person subj ectively , mistakenly 
be li eves that it is justified. In such cases of mistaken justification , the 
actor be lieves that her conduct avoids a greater harm , when in fac t it 
does not. T he club-wielding attacker , when successfully overcome 
and dragged to the street light , turns out to be a jogger carrying a 
flashlight whose bulb is out. W hether bea ting the jogger-mistaken-
21. See 1 ROBI NSON. supra note 3. ~ 8.5(c). a t 428 n.28 (l is ting and upda tin g 
authoriti es). 
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for-an-attacker is justified depends again on wheth er th e justification 
defense is give n (1) because the conduct in fact is justified. o r (2) 
because the person acts for a justified reason. 
U nd er a reasons theory, the force used aga inst the joggc r-
mistaken-for-an-attacker is justified because it is use d for the purpose 
of se lf-defense. The actor 's reason is right even if th e conduct is 
wrong. U nder the deeds theory, a pe rson who mistakenly believes 
t hat the cond uct is justified is not just ified . although the person may 
gZt in an excuse defense if the mistake is reason ab le or perhaps a 
mitigat ion even if it is not. 22 
Note that in this case the end result under the two theor ies 
seems to be the sa me. The difference is primarily a labeling matter: 
T he perso n who reasonabl y but mistakenly believes that he r conduct 
is justified is ' 'justified" under the reasons theory but only "excused .. 
under th e deeds theory. This difference m ay h ave practical 
implications for third parties. For example, a jurisdiction might 
criminalize resistance to justified force, like a lawful arres t , yet allow 
resistance to excused force , like that of the psychotic aggressor. 23 
T his common approach creates problems for use of the reasons 
theory. Presumably we want the victim to be able lawfully to resist 
the actor who is mistaken as to a justification. The jogger mistaken 
for a mugger ought to be able lawfully to resist the misguided attack. 
But, if the attacker mistakenly believes she is justified and, as the 
reasons theory would have it, that makes her " justified," then the 
criminal code must do some fancy dancing to reach the proper result. 
I t must create a special rule that allows defenders to defe nd against 
these special kinds of justified attacks but not other kinds of justified 
attacks. 
But, putting aside this third-party complication for the reasons 
theory, the result of the two theories is the same for the actor at 
hand. Both the deeds theory's excuse defense and the reasons 
theory's justification defense exculpate the actor who mistakenly 
believes she is justified. Yet, the different views of justification may 
show themselves in another aspect of defense formulations that has 
been the subject of much disagreement: the proper treatment of 
mistake as to a justification . All agree that a reasonable mistake as 
to a justification ought to exculpate fully. ·what is the proper 
22. See, e.g. , MODEL PENAL COD E § 3.09(2) (1985) (providing reduced li ab ility for 
unreasonab le mistakes as to a justifi ca tion) . 
23. See, e.g., id. § 3.11(1) (defining "unlawful force ," which trigge rs a right of justified 
defensive force, as includin g the attack of th e psychotic aggressor but excluding privileged 
(objectively justified) fo rce, such as th at used to make a lawful arrest) . 
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trea tme nt of an unre asonable mistake as to a justification? 
A majority o f jurisdict ions permit a mistake-as-to-a-justification 
defe nse only if the actor 's mistake is reasonable . An unreasonable 
mistake, reckless or negligent , gives no defe nse and hence generates 
full liabi lity for the substantive offense Y A minority of jurisdictions 
give a complete defe nse fo r reasonab le mistake bu t also a llow a 
mitiga ti on for an honest but unreasonab le mistake. 25 The level of 
li ability , tha t is . the ex ten t of the mitigation given , typicall y is ti ed to 
the leve l of cu lpabi lity of th e mistake: A neglige nt mistake. being 
less culpable th a n a reckless mistake, gives a greater mi t iga tion th an 
does a reckless mi stake .2r, 
The few jurisdict ions that take th e deeds approach m 
formula ting the ir justifi ca tion defenses objec tive ly (for example, 
North Dakota a nd the Proposed Federal Criminal Code) all give 
mitigations for unreasonable mistakes as to a justificationY In 
contrast, a majority of the jurisdictions that take a reasons approach 
and formulate their justification defenses subjectively take the aU-o r-
nothing approach, giving no mitigation or defense for unreasonable 
mistakes as to a justification.28 This pattern suggests a connection 
between the deeds-reasons dispute and the dispute over the proper 
treatmen t of unreasonable mistakes as to a justification. But the fact 
is there is no logical reason why the reasons theory should demand an 
aU-or-nothing approach. 
One could speculate about the source of the apparent 
correlation between the reasons theory and the aU-or-nothing 
approach. If one views mistaken justification as a justification , it 
would be easy to conclud e that an aU-or-nothing approach is needed . 
After all , aU-or-nothing is the way objective justifica tion does 
operate. Either the actor's conduct avoids a greater harm and is to 
be encouraged or at least tolerated in the future , or it does not avoid 
a greater harm and is to be discouraged in the future. When the 
subjective reasons theory of justification combines obj ecti ve 
justification and mistaken subj ective justification under the same 
24. See 2 ROB!i\ISO N, supra note 3, § 184(a), at 395 n.l (listing and updating 
au thorities). 
25. See 2 id. 
26. See, e.g .. MOD EL PENA L CODE§ 3.09(2) . 
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-05-01 to -09 (1985) ; NATIONA L COM tv!! SS ION ON 
REFORM OF FED ER AL CRI MINAL LAW, A PROPOSED NEW FED ERAL CRIMINAL CODE 
ch.6 (1971 ). For a li st of juri sdicti ons that have at least one objective justi fi ca tion statu te , 
see 2 ROB INSON , supra note 3, § 122(e) , at 22 n.l9. 
28. See 2 ROB INSON, supra note 3, § 184(a), at 395 n.l (listing and updat ing 
authorities) . 
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label, "justified ," it should be no surprise that such labeling creates 
the tendency to treat a mis taken jus lification as if it were a true 
objective justifica tion. It should be no surpri se to see mistake as to a 
justification treated, like a ll othe r jus tificat ions, as an all-or-noth ing 
IS:iu e . 
T his same possib ility fo r confu sio r-: docs no t exist under th e 
deeds approach to fo rm ulating justifica tions . T he deed s theory 
di stinguishes true objective just ificcn io ns from mistakes as to a 
justification , anci it treats th e !<n te r as excuses. Objective 
jus t ifications are p;·operl y all -or-n o thing matters. M istakes as to a 
just ificat[o n, !ike o th e r exc us e~ .. j u~;t <1 S ct•..::arly are not ali-or-no thing 
rtl Ztt ters. E xcuses fu nction as part of l;m·· s adjudicat ion of an actor 's 
blameworthiness for a vio lation. Blameworthiness exis ts on a 
continuum, as is evident by th e doctrines that contribute to this 
function. 
A mong the differe n t func:tions of the criminal law, objective 
justifications serve the ex ante ruie articul ation function , telli ng 
people the rules for future conduct. Conversely , excuses, including 
mistaken justification , perform an ex post adjudication function , 
assessing the degree of liability and puni shment for a violation of the 
rules of conduct. 2Y 
In performing the adjudication function, doctrines commonly 
express degrees of liability and punishment. For example , criminal 
codes typically recogn ize levels of culpability: purpose, knowledge, 
reck lessness, and negligence . The law also recognizes mitigations for 
partial excuses in both its definition of offenses (such as the extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance mitigation in homicide30) and its 
sen tencing rules (such as the federal sentencing guideline 
authorization fo r sentence reduction below the guidelines for 
offenders influenced by coercion, duress, or diminished capacity-' ' ). 
Under the deeds theory , m istakes as to a justification are seen as 
excuses, and like other doctrines for the adjudication of an actor 's 
b lameworthiness, the resulting liab ility m ay reflect a continuum of 
iiability. Reasonable mistakes m ay excuse entire ly, while the 
culpability inherent in unreasonable mistakes may sugges t something 
less- a mitigation rathe r than a defense. 
29. See Paul H. Ro binson. A Fu nctional A nulysis of Crim inal La w, 88 Nw. U. L. R EV. 
057. 889-96 (1994); Pa ul H . Robinson. Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication , 57 
U . C HI. L. REV. 729,729-71 (1990) . 
30. See, e.g., M ODE L PENAL C ODE§ 2 10.3(1 )(b) . 
3 1. See, e.g .. U.S. SENTENCING GUID ELI N ES M ANUA L §§ 5K2.12, 5K2.13 (1 997) . 
THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION 
C. The Importance of Community Views in the Formulation of' 
Criminal L aw 
1105 
Before we launch into an exposi tiOn of the process of 
determin ing community moral intuitions in the reasons versus deeds 
controversy , we ought to say just '>v hy we think com munity views are 
rel evant to the debate. F irst those debnting the issue have conceded 
the rele vance of commun ity views, when they mak e statements 
point ing out tha t the deeds theory of just ification is ' ·absurd . "~2 'vVhat 
thi s conclusion turns out to mean is that the author of that sta tement 
feels that the deeds theory violates his m oral intuitions . ;1nd it implies 
that his rno ral intuitions are th ose that a ll community mernbers wo uld 
also hold . T his is an empirical proposition; it may tu rn out that the 
co mmunity ho lds vinvs that resemble a deeds theory of justification 
rather than a re asons th eory or, as that writer asser ts, vice versa . In 
any event, those writers appealing to moral intui tions to support their 
theory have conceded , at a minimum, that the com munity intuitions 
deserve a place in the debateY Thus one task is to determine 
community moral intuitions, the degree to which these intuitions 
support any of the relevant justifica tory theories, and the consensus 
with which community members hold their views. 
A second reason for seeking to discover community views is that 
it is at least necessary to know when legal codes, fo r whatever reason, 
conflict with or override the moral intuitions of the governed 
community. For when they do , it is useful for the code drafters to 
educate the community as to why the code form ulation is preferable , 
e ither morally or otherwise. 'vVithout th is education , conflicts that 
the community discovers between legal codes and moral intuitions 
are likely to engender socially destructive sentiments and actions on 
the part of the governed. (Think of the consequences of prohibition 
in the U nited States?1) 
Of course, it is possible tha t citizens are unaware of the conflict 
between codes and their moral intuitions-which brings us to the 
third reason to discover community intuitions in various areas 
governed by codes. Absent knowledge of the tr ue provisions of the 
code, citizens are likely to believe that the code conforms with their 
ovvn m oral intuitions. 35 If the communi ty moral intuitions are in fact 
32. See Hogan , supra note 7, at 680. 
33. See supra note 3 an d accompanying text. 
34. See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Da rley. The Utility of Desert. 91 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 453,487 (1997) . 
35. In a recen t study. New J e rsey cit izens repor ted that attemp t was crimin a lized by 
the state code in ways thnt were tightly coupled with the ir own morn! intu itions, but very 
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quite deviant from the actual content of the code. the code is failing 
its ex ante function , fa iling to provide known clear guideli nes that 
people can use to govern their conduct. 
Finally, we have argued elsewhere that th e criminal code ought 
tu be in general agreement with the moral pr inciples of those the 
code gove rns. 30 Here is a brief summary of th e argument: The rea l 
power to enforce compliance with society's rules of prescribed 
conduct lies not in the threat or reality of officid criminal sa nction, 
but in the povver of the intert'Yvined forces of social and ind ividua l 
n1o:·<.!l con troL T he networks of in tercersonal relationshios in which 
L • 
peop ie find themselves, the social norms and prohibi tions shared 
among those re la tionships and transmitted through those socia l 
net\vorks, and the internalized representations of thc·se norrns and 
moral precepts cause people to obey the law.37 
The law is not irrelevant to these social and personal forces. 
Criminal law, in particular, plays a central role in creating and 
maintaining the social consensus necessary for sustaining mora l 
norms. In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may 
be the only society-wide mechanism that transcends cultural and 
ethnic differences. T hus , the criminal law's most important real 
world effect is arguably its ability to assist in the building, shaping, 
and maintaining of these norms and moral principles. It contributes 
to and harnesses the compliance-producing power of interpersonal 
re lationships and personal morality.38 
The criminal law can have a second effect in gaining comp liance 
with its commands. If it earns a reputation as a reliable statement of 
what the community, given sufficient information and time to refl ect, 
perce ives as condemnable , people are more likely to defer to its 
commands as morally authoritative and as appropriate to fo llow in 
those borderline cases in which the propriety of certain conduct is 
unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the actor. The importance of 
this ro le should not be underes timated; in a society with the complex 
interdependencies characteristic of ours, an apparently harmless 
action can have destructive consequences. 'When the action is 
criminalized by the legal system, one wants the citizen to respect the 
law in such an instance even though he or she does not immediately 
poorly coupled to the actual code provisions. See John Darley et a!., Conununity 
Swndards fo r Defining Allempr: Inconsistencies with the Model Penal Code . 39 AM. 
BEH AV. SCI. 405, 414 (1996). 
36. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 34. 
37. See id. at 468-71. 
38. Seeid. at 471 -74. 
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intuit why that action is banned. Such deference IS facilitated if 
citizens are disposed to believe that the law is an accurate guide to 
appropriate prudential and moral behavior.'9 
T he extent of the criminal law's effectiveness in both these 
respects-in facilitating and communicating societal consensus on 
what is and is not condemnable, and in gaining compliance in 
borderline cases th rough deference to its moral authority-is to a 
Q.reat ex tent cleoendcnt on the cle£ree of moral credibilitv that the 
'-' 1 ..__; ..1 
criminal law h<1S ach ieved in the minds of the ci tizen s it governs. 
Thus. the criminal law's moral credibility is essent izll to effective 
crime control and is enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability 
is perceived as '"d oing justice," that is, if it ass igns liability and 
punishment in ways that the community perceives as consistent with 
the community 's principles of appropriate liability and punishment. 
Conversely, the system's moral credibility, and therefore its crime-
control effectiveness, is undermined by a distribution of liability that 
deviates from community perceptions of just desert. 
The central point is this: The criminal law's power in nurturing 
and communicating societal norms and its power to have people 
defer to it in unanalyzed cases are directly proportional to criminal 
law's moral credibility. If criminalization or conviction (or 
decriminalization or refusal to convict) is to have an effect in the 
norm-nurturing process, it will be because the criminal law has a 
reputation for criminalizing and punishing only that which deserves 
moral condemnation, and for decriminalizing and not punishing that 
which does not. If, instead, the criminal law's reputation is one 
simply of a collection of rules, which do not necessarily reflect the 
community's perceptions of moral blameworthiness , then there is 
little reason to expect the criminal law to be relevant to the societal 
debate over what is and is not condemnable and little reason to defer 
to it as a moral authority. 
We now need to turn to the task of discovering how the 
community thinks about the cases that discriminate a reasons theory 
of justification from a deeds theory, whether there are describable 
principles that match the community's judgments, and whether there 
is some degree of consensus among the judging community. 
39. See id. at 474-76. 
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II. TOOLS FO R T ESTING CRHviiNAL LAW THEORIES: SOCIAL 
PSYCHO LO GY S CENA RIO RESEARCH 
A. Scenarios and Measures 
T he method we chose to probe subjects' moral intuitions in this 
study was the scenario or vignette method. Subjects are presented 
with a short descripti on of a person 's conduct and are asked whethe r 
the actor should receive lia bility for the conduct and , if so, how much. 
Subj ects next are gi ve n an other scen ario, and assess liability and 
o un ishment for that actor. then anot her sce nario , and so on. Th e: 
1 
scenarios are va ried by th e re se<Jrch ers in ways sugges ted by th e 
theories being tested , and the patte rnin g of liabilities assigned each 
scenario provide differential support for the competing theories. 
Rather than hrtving the subj ec ts work their way through wha t 
can quite quickly become a large number of differing scenarios, why 
not just ask the subj ects whe ther they think a reason-centered or a 
deed-centered theory of justifications is appropriate? Because 
psychologists have discovered that subjects often do not have mental 
access to the principles they use to make decisions and thus they 
cannot accurately articulate those principles.40 Instead they are often 
driven to report principles that see m plausible to them at the time but 
demonstrably do not match their actual decisions. 41 Therefore 
researchers carry out what is called a policy-capturing study, in which 
40. See Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression 
Approaches to the Srudy of Information Processing in Judgm enr. 6 ORG ANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & H u M. PERF. 649 (1 971). In this a rticle . the authors describe an e a rl y 
demonstration of thi s propos ition th at is relevant to the present study. They reviewed 
studies in which the subj ect 's task was first to make judgments and second to a rticulate 
how tl1ey came to the judgme nts they made . See id. at 683-84. An example o f such a 
judgme nt would be what we ights a stockbroker ass igned to various items of information 
in forming his judgment abo ut the desirability of a particular company's stock . In th e 
studies they reviewed "all found se rious discre panr:ies between th e subj ective and 
[objective] re lative weights.'' !d. at 684. Th a t is, th e judgment-m akers were inaccurate in 
reporting the weights they in fact placed on the va rious dim ensions when they made th e ir 
actual judgments . See id. 
More general ev idence for thi s proposition is revi ewed in Rich ard E. Nisbett & 
Timo thy D ecamp Wilson. Telling /\!lore rhan We Can Kno w: Verbal R eports on M ental 
Pro cesses, 84 PSYCHOL. REv. 231, 231 -59 (1977). Th e authors' study sho ws th a t 
indi vid uals sometimes fail to acknowledge the influence o f aspects of the stimulus that 
actua lly make a diffe re nce in their judgments, see id. at 243-45 , and oth e r times re port as 
influential the effect of aspects th a t in fact do not enter their judgment processes at all. 
see id. a t 245-46. 
41 . See N isbett & Wilson. supra note 40 , at 247-59 (s ugges ting th a t people repo rt 
what their own impl icit theories of decision -making mark as important , rather th an wh a t 
is actua lly important to th e m in prac tice ). 
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subjects judge actual cases. The researchers then infer the subjects' 
judging principles from the resulting patterning of responses to 
different cases.~2 
This is what we did in the present research. \Ve presented 
subjects with short scenario descriptions of potentially criminal 
actions. Because the focus of our research was on contrasting the 
reasons theory with the deeds theory of justification defenses, we 
designed the variations in our scenarios to reflect those different 
theories. Generally. two cases differed in a way that vvcmld "make a 
difference" to, for instance . a person who held a reasons-centered 
view but not to a person with a deeds-centered view. "rviake a 
difference" here means that the t\vo cases would generate different 
liability judgments if the subject took one view of the theory of 
justification, but not if she took the other view. 
In other words, we conducted an experiment. Experimentation 
is an unusual tactic in research concerning legal issues; other 
empirical techniques such as opinion surveys, or the examination of 
existing records, or other archival procedures are more common. 
Part of what we seek to demonstrate to criminal law theorists and 
code drafters is that experimentation, used to capture individuals' 
patterns of liability assignment, can provide useful information on 
their issues of debate. 
Subjects first read a paragraph of core information that gave the 
background to the various scenarios: 
Jake is a farmer who has already harvested his corn crop. 
His neighbor has not done so, so his three acres of corn are 
still in the fields. The corn crop makes the difference, for 
these farmers, between having a profitable season because 
they have winter feed for their animals, or going into debt. 
Running around several sides of Jake and his neighbor's 
fields are dirt roads. Jake's farm and his neighbor's farm 
are on a neck of land that stretches out into a lake. Out on 
the end of the neck of land is the local town. Jake's 
neighbor's fields cut the town off from the mainland, but 
Jake's fields do not. The following map shows you this 
layout. 
42. See Robert S. Billings & Stephen A. Marcus. J'v!easures of Compensarory and 
Noncompensatory Models of Decision Behavior: Process Tracing Versus Policy 
Coptllring, 31 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERF. 331, 331 (1983) (commenting 
that "one of the oldest and most widely used techniques (for making inferences about the 
decision process) is that of policy capturing. wherein the model guiding the decision 
process is inferred from the relationship between the cues provided and the judgment of 
the subject"). 
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At this point , the subj ects were given the map below in Figure l. 
which makes clear the essentia l point: The neighbor's fie lds, but not 
J akc ·s fields, if burned, would create a successful firebrea k for the 
tO\VI1 . 
FIGURE 1 
Next the subjects read a specific scenario and assigned a liability 
to the perpetrator described in it. F or instance, one offense scenario 
read as follows : 
Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of 
water from a creek that the two share. vVhen he knows that 
his neighbor is away, he se ts fire to the neighbor's three 
acres of corn. Because the field is bounded on ail sides by 
dirt roads, and there is no wind , it is clear that the burning 
will create no danger beyond that of destroying the corn. 
T he fire destroys the entire crop. 
EOl?!ES OF JUSTJFICA TION 1 1 ~ . 1 ll l 
This scenano is obviously a case of an offense of moderate 
senousness. and \Ve u.s::: it to establish 
would ilive to this oarticular offense. 
~· 1 
comparison for later cases. a "control'' 
the sente nce that subjects 
It provides a point of 
or "contrast"" case, to see 
whether subjects think the subsequent cases , in wh ich justifications 
for the burning are ·ve n . deserve less liability and punishrnent than 
the proLotype the unjLtstified offense . 
ScH-ne ocook m ~ssiun r·onsistent1v hioher :;.1bilit;,,< th·,~~l~t.1 .l ~ - ··'-- "-!:J ,_., ·- - -"-_; :.::._-.,1 ~...- .i-'--•. J_\._..,, 
others. T hese diffe rences are not the focus of ou1· concerns. In the 
experir11ental IV ! ' <'110"C in ' '110!.C11 nu'oie'rt c ,· c. ,~,,,,nr'ta·~] to ''C"c~ 1'') l '1 .. .-- .... 1 0 ~ _1_ 'I ~ 1 .') J ....., L,._) _t ~ .... ...._ ) \.__! \.) _.. •-... ~ i..,.... t. ._) V ( l 
srencrrin" ir jc· n ( •l re] PV '}'l t V/herher earh SUbJ'P('i· \":1': ,~~ .oe "l C~ ]'c'llhr ..., ._ _,~_ ~,-'--' ~J , .._L_.._) J.<.J '- L .._.,, L. l --'-- ,_, _ ·~ _ .,_.,._.._ >(,_ ,) ,___._t::Jt._ ___ 1.) 
harsh o r easy :;cntencer. Om interest is in the pattern ing of the 
difference in lia bility between specific scenarios. not the absolute 
amount of liabili ty in any scenario. 
As noted above , scenarios differ in ways designed to e licit one 
pattern of liability assignments if the subject uses a reasons theory of 
justification. and another if the subject uses a deeds-theory. For 
instance, another scenario read as follows: 
J ake is angry with his neigh bor over a dispute a bout use of 
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that 
his neighbor is away , he sets fire to the neighbor 's three 
acres of corn. B ecause the field is bounded on all sides by 
dirt roads , it is clear that the burning will create no danger 
beyond that of destroying the neighbor's corn. The fire 
destroys the entire crop. Unbeknown to Jnke, lightning has 
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fie lds and 
the local town and the fire is burning toward the town and 
endangering the people who live there. H is burning the 
field creates a firebreak: The town and its inhabitants are 
saved. 
From a reasons perspective, the perpetrator is equally liable in 
both cases-he intended a harmful act. The fact that the act had a 
second, helpful, unintended, consequence is irrelevant. B ut it is not 
irrelevant to a person holding a deeds-based theory. T herefore an 
individual assigning a significantly lower liability to this second case 
is revealing that she holds a deeds-based theory of justification, while 
an individual who assigns this case the same liability as the previous 
one is revealing a reason-based theory. 
Notice that we have attempted, and we hope succeeded, in 
making the two scenarios differ in only one way, the way that is 
relevant to the theoretical comparison in question. T he subjects 
should have perceived the different scenarios as having the same 
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overall characte1·istics, s::1 that any di fferences in liabilities ;Jssignecl 
can be attributed to the one char-acteristic that is varied between the 
contrasting scenarios. 
T he task of each subject, then. in response to each scenario was 
to assig:n a degree of liabilitv to the orotagonist in the scenario~-in 
'-....-' '- ,.) l .._. 
their view, to assign punishment to a wrongdoer. Subjects did this by 
marking their judgment on the scale shown below, a scale with which 
they quickly became familiar: 
LlABlLlTY SCALE 
0 ll 
no liab. tiab. 1 c!Jy 2 wks 2 rno 6 mo 1 yr _1 yr 7 yr 15 yr 30 yr life 
but no imprison-
puni:-h. m~nt 
As can be seen, the scale gave subjects a choice of assigning to 
the protagonist no criminal liability, liability but no punishment, or 
eleven leve ls of punishment, prison sentences ranging from one day 
in jail to the death penalty. Notice that the difference between two 
adjacent prison sentences becomes greater as one moves to the right 
end of the scale . For instance, an assignment of punishment level 2 is 
an assignment of two weeks in prison, an increase of only thirteen 
days over punishment level 1. An assignment of punishment level 9 
is a fifteen-year increase from the punishment represented by level 8. 
Vve constructed the scale in this way for two reasons. First , and 
primarily, the differences correspond to the differences in grading 
categories used in typical American criminal codes.43 This 
correspondence is quite important because it means that we can 
translate a difference between two liability units into a difference of 
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West Supp. 1998) (defining five grades of 
felonies and two grades of misdemeanors, carrying statutory maximum punishment terms 
of the death penalty and life imprisonment. 30, 15, 5, and 1 year, and 60 days 
imprisonment): 730 ILL. CO!v!P. STAT. 5/5-8-1 , 5/5-8-3 (West 1993) (defining seven grades 
of felonies and three grades of misdemeanors , carrying the maximum terms of death 
penalty and life imprisonme;1t. 30, 20, 15, 7, 5, 3, and 1 year. 6 months, and 30 days 
imprisonment): N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 60.06, 70.00, 70.15 (McKinney 1998) (defining five 
grades of felonies and two grades of misdemeanors, carrying the maximum terms of the 
death penalty and life imprisonment, 25, 15, 7, 4, and 1 year , and 3 months imprisonment): 
VA. CODE ANN.§§ 18.2-9, 18.2--10, 18.2-12 (Michie 1996) (defining six grades of felonies 
and four grades of misdemeanors , carrying the maximum terms of the death penaltv and 
life imprisonment, 20, 10, 5. and 1 year. and 6 months imprisonment). 
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one offense grade in a criminal code .-+-; Second , this scheme is useful 
because the diffe rences correspond, roughly at least , to what ordinary 
people perceive as equal differences betwe en sentences . Thus these 
sor ts of differences are the ones available to code drafters when they 
decide hmv to grade an offense, the ones juries and judges must deal 
with when sentencing a convicted offe nder. and perhaps the ones that 
come to the minds o f citizens vvhen they read and think about 
crirnin al sentences.-'5 
In designing the scenarios, our task was to create as many as 
were needed to proYidc a reasonably compl ete test of the 
implications of the reaso n- and deed-based theories and their 
differences. VIe found th at eleven scenarios were needed. The fu ll 
text of these scenarios is p resented in the Appendix to this Article . 
'Wh at is revealed by contrasts be tween various scenarios we will 
describe in detail in Part IV. 
Pilot testing indicated that the eleven scenarios could be read 
and evaluated by a subject in approximately half an hour. Further, 
the subjects were able to maintain concentration ; their reports 
indicated that they found the task quite interesting and were 
intrigued by thinking about what differences in the cases "made a 
difference" to them. Each of our subj ects responded to all of the 
cases. In the experimental design literature, a study having these 
characteristics is referred to as a "within-subj ects design. " This 
design focuses the subjects ' attention on the differences between the 
scenarios. The danger is that they think that the existence of a 
difference implies an instruction from the researcher that the 
difference should " make a difference, " that is, that it should provoke 
different liability assignments fro m th e subj ect.46 T o counter this 
possibility, we told subjects that we did not expect that different 
scenarios necessarily should ge t different liability judgments and that 
they were to give us their own judgments abou t what differences 
mattered. Looking over the individual response protocols from this 
experiment and other similar ones we have conducted, we note that 
44. T he utility of th is co rrespo nde nce will become cle ar in later d iscussions of the 
in te rpre tations of th e res ults. See infra text accompanying notes 57-70. 
45. The scale used here is the sam e as the one de ve loped an d fi rs t used in PAU L H . 
ROBI NS ON & J O HN M . D A RLE Y, J USTJ CE . LlA BJLITY , A ND BLAi'v! E: COMMUNITY V IEWS 
A ND TH E C RIMINAL L AW (1995) . in whi ch we report th e res ults of a number of studies 
that map the community"s percept ions of the app ro priate li abiliti es to assign in various 
cri minal si tua tio ns . For a more lengthy d iscussion of the sca le and its propert ies, see id. a t 
223-25 . 
46. For a fuller discussion of the strengths and wea knesses of within-subjects designs 
in th is sor t of research , see id. at 221 -22. 
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subj ects did rate some cases alike as to the li a bilities they generated . 
As is usual in these designs, the order in which the cases were 
given to the subjects was randomized. T o make the subj ects ' 
contrast ing task simpler for them, cases with one dimension of 
variation were grouped together. The order of cases within these 
groups. as wel l as the order in which th e groups were presented , was 
randomize d in order to prevent resul ts from being undetectab ly 
dependen t upon the order in which the scenarios were judged. 
B. The Sample of Subjects 
Any research study must se lect subjects from the popula tion 
about which the research generalizations arc intended to apply. O ur 
concern is with the moral intuitions of the community of citizens 
governed by the laws in question. Given that this research is about 
differences in the rationale for criminal sentencing that exist at the 
national level, eventually one would wan t to construct a national 
sample of subjects. For this initial study of the issue, practical 
considerations limited our selection of one se t of subjects to the lists 
of jury-eligible citizens in a town in New Jersey.47 The second set 
consisted of college students who were readily available for research. 
It is sometimes suggested that students are atypical , in that their 
responses would differ from so-called ordinary people . Since we had 
both students and ordinary people in our research, we were able to 
test this contention. 
We tested twenty-seven students (average age 19.2) and twenty-
one jury-eligible community members (average age 50.8); men and 
women were equally represented in both samples , as were the major 
religious affiliations of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. Two of each 
sample were African-Americans, for a total of four in a panel of 
forty-eight. Most subjects in both samples identified themselves as 
politically moderate, with the students leaning a little more to the 
liberal side of the continuum. Students filled out the questionnaires 
in a room on campus; for the community members, questionnaires 
were mailed out to them, and occasionally after a telephoned 
reminder, the questionnaires were mailed back to us. As expected , 
conservatives assigned slightly higher liabilities to the various 
scenarios we presented. Our jury-eligible community members also 
assigned slightly higher liabilities, over and above the fact that 
47. Of those contacted, 56% agreed to participate. This rather high rate of 
participation was probably the result of the subjects' ag reement with our explan ation of 
the goals of the research. 
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conservatives did so. What is important, for our purposes, is that the 
two groups of subjects did not show any significant difference in their 
pattern of relative linbility assigned among the scenarios. 
II I. LIABILITY PREDICTIONS 
In justification defenses, we are in the minority of 
commentators. 10 We believe the community's Vle\vs art.:: more 
accurately reflected in doctrine based upon a deeds Lheorv of 
justification. It matlers to lay persons whether a net societal harm 
actually occurs or not. we think, just as it matters to them \vhether a 
prohibited result, such as a resulting death. occurs or not. In 
particular, we think the community sees the unknmvingly justified 
actor as deserving the reduced liability of attempt rather than the full 
liability that would come from denying a justification defense.4~ As 
to the reverse case of mistake as to a justifica tion, we think the 
community views unreasonable mistakes as to a justification as 
deserving mitigation, in contrast to the majority rule in the United 
States.50 We describe below exactly how these general claims 
translate into specific predictions with regard to the liability results of 
the scenarios used in the study. 
The first six scenarios are contrast cases, the responses to which 
established benchmarks for each test subject. These scenarios 
provide the full range of possible liability, as well as a variety of 
intermediate points. Not only do they give us results of considerable 
intrinsic interest in their own right, but more importantly for the 
present purposes, they allow us to interpret the liability results of the 
last five scenarios, the test scenarios. For each test scenario, we used 
as a point of comparison the contrast scenario most relevant with 
respect to the competing theories, from a case of an intentional 
unjustified act to a completely justified act, or any one of the many 
possibilities between those two extremes on the continuum of 
liability. Taken together, the following six contrast cases represent 
all of the obvious variations of a non-justification case to which the 
subjects' responses might be compared. 
48. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text. 
49. See supra text accompanying note 21 (discussing attempt liability). 
50. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. 
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A. Th e Contrast Cases 
Scenario 1. Inte ntional (Unjustified) Burning 
Scenario 1 prese nts the prototype case of a burning tha t JS 
intentional and for which no claim of justification exists: 
Jake is angry with his nei ghbor over a dispute about use of 
water from a creek th at the two sh2re . V/hen he k nO\vs tha t 
his neighbor is a\vay, he sets fir e to the neighbor's three 
acres of corn. Because the fie ld is bounded on al l sides by 
dirt roads. and the re is no wine!. it is clear that the burn ing 
will create no danger beyo nd that of destroying the corn. 
The fire destroys the entire crop. 
vVe expect the liabi li ty here to be somewhere mid-scale because 
the offense is against only property . Our past work suggests that it is 
not likely to inspire the heavy penalties at the higher end of the 
scale .51 Its purpose is to give us a liability rating against which we can 
compare the liabilities assigned to other scenarios. 
Scenario 2. Attempted (Unjustified) Burning 
Scenario 2 is similar to scenario 1 except that the harm intended 
does not actually come about: 
Just as Jake sets the fire, the neighbor unexpectedly returns 
and puts it out before it does any harm. 
A crime like this one typically is treated as an attempt , as 
compared to that in scenario 1, which is referred to as the substantive 
offense. From our past work , we expect the liability here to be 
substantially Jess than that imposed in scenario 1, even though the 
actor's conduct and inten tion are identical in the two cases.52 The 
fact is , th e vast majority of lay persons share a strong intuition that 
whether or not the planned harm does or does not occur makes a 
difference and that the occurrence of harm increases the punishment 
deserved . No claim of justification is at issue in scenario 2. 
Scenario 3. Created Risk of (Unjustified) Burning, Realized-
Reckless Commission 
Scenario 3 differs from scenario 2 in that the actor only risks the 
burning, rather than intending it. But as in scenario 1, he re the harm 
actually comes about: 
51. See, e.g .. R OBINSON & D A RLEY, supra note 45 , at s tud ies 6, 8, 11. 18. 
52. See id . at studies 1. 17. 
l 
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Like all of the local farme rs. Jake routinely piles dry 
cornhusks near wh e re they are cut and eventually burns 
them. Jake has one such pile near his neighbor's fields. 
Jake wants to get the pile burned quickly; the previous year 
he waited and the pile got soaked by rain. He is aware that 
high winds are fo recast for today; '>Vinds that crea te a real 
risk that his fir e will jump the gap bet\veen his trash pile and 
his neighbor 's com fi-:-~ ld s . D espite this danger, Jake burns 
his trash pile , ho pi ng the fire will not jump to his neighbor 's 
crop. The winds con1c and the fire jumps to his neighbor 's 
crop. T he fire cksi:roys the en tire crop . 
1117 
We expect the liability here, as in scenario 2. to be less than that 
m scenario 1. Such an uffense typically is termed a "crime of 
recklessness." 
Scenario 4. Created R isk o f (U njustified) Burn ing, Unrealized-
E ndangerment 
Scenario 4 is simi lar to scenario 3, but here, luckily , the harm 
does not come about: 
Despite [the danger from the high winds], Jake burns his 
trash pile, hoping the fi re will not jump to his neighbor's 
crop. The winds come but, Jake is lucky, the fire does not 
jump to his neighbor 's crop. 
We think the !lability will be less here than in scenario 3. 
Liability also will be less than in scenario 2, we think, because here 
the actor does not intend the harm but only risks it. This is an 
application of the principle noted in our earli er work that greater 
punishment is due for greater culpable state of mind:53 Intending to 
burn is more culpable than intend ing to create a risk of burning, all 
other things being equal. Offenses like this commonly are termed 
"end angerment" offenses. No claim of justification is at issue in the 
scenano. 
These four cases present variations of the culpability and harm 
variables, as evidenced in Table 1. 
53. See id. at studi es 8. 9. 16. 
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T ABLE 1. INTERRELATION OF C ONTR AST CASES J T HROUGH 4 
Harm No Harm 
In tentional Sce n ario 1 
I Scenario 2 I 
Substantive Offense I A ttempt 
·~ 
Reck less Scen ario 3 l Scen ario 4 Reckless Offense E nd angerm e nt 
Scenario 5. A ttempted Risk Creation-Attempted Endangerm ent 
In sce nario 5 the actor thinks he is creating a criminal risk, but in 
fact no such risk is created. In other words , it is a case of attempted 
endangerment rather than the actual end angerment of scenario 4: 
Despite [the danger of high winds], Jake burns his trash pile, 
hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor 's crop. It turns 
out th at the weather forecast was in error about the wind. 
Jake 's burning never creates any danger to his ne ighbor 's 
field. 
We think it will have even less li ability than scenario 4. In 
scenario 4, a risk of the h arm was in fact crea ted , while here no such 
risk is created; the actor only mistakenly believes that it is crea ted. 
Scenario 5 (risk intended but no risk occurs) bears the sam e relation 
to scenari o 4 (risk intended and risk occurs) that scenario 2 (burning 
intended but does not occur) bears to sce nario 1 (burning intended 
and occurs). No claim of justifica tion is at issue in the scenario. 
Scenario 6. Intentional J ustified Burning 
In scenario 6, the fin al contrast case, the burning occurs but is 
clearly justified, under both a reasons and a deeds theory. Not only 
do the obj ective circumstances actually exist that make the burning 
the right thing to do , but the actor knows of the justifying 
circumstances and acts because of them: 
Jake hears over his Citizen' s Band rad io that lightning has 
started a fire upwind from his and his ne ighbor 's fields an d 
the local town and that the fire is burning toward the town 
and endangering the people who live there. He can see the 
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smoke from the approaching fire and calculates th a t if he 
burns his neighbor' s corn crop he can create a firebrea k that 
will stop the fire. (Remember that Jake's own fi eld is not 
located where it could serve as a fireb reak.) Jake knows 
that his neighbor is not available to ask fo r perm ission. and 
he burns the fields. The fire destroys the entire crop. 
Because of his quick work the town and its inhabitants are 
saved. 
\Ve think Jake will get a complete defense in.this sccn<Eio. 
B. The Tesr Cases 
1119 
\Vc now turn to the scenarios that discrimina te bet"vveen the two 
competing theories. As described above, a subject's response to each 
of these cases is compared to her response to one or more of the 
contrast cases relevant from the point of view of the compet ing 
theories. It is from this comparison that we infer the subject's views. 
Scenario 7. U nknowingly Justified Burning 
Scenario 7 is the case of the unknowingly justified actor: 
Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of 
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that 
his neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three 
acres of corn. Because the field is bounded on all sides by 
dirt roads, it is clear that the burning will crea te no danger 
beyond that of destroying the neighbor's corn. The fire 
destroys the entire crop. Unbeknown to Jake, ligh tning has 
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and 
the local town and the fire is burning toward the town and 
endangering the people who live there. H is burning the 
field creates a firebreak: The town and its inhabitants are 
saved. 
Recall that the deeds theory, which we think better represents 
community views, predicts this liability to be similar to that of 
scenario 2, the attempt case. The actor 's liability is based entire ly 
upon his intention to burn without justifica tion , the classic rationale 
for punishing an attempt. The reasons theory predicts that the actor 
will have no defense and therefore vvill be liable for the full offense, 
the same liability as in scenario 1. 
Scenario 8. Knowingly Justified Burning but with Bad Motive 
Scenario 8 is a case in which the justifying circumstances exist 
and the actor knows about them, but he acts for a bad motive, rather 
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than for a justificatory purpose: 
Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that ligh tning has 
started a fire uowind from his and his neighbor's fie lds and ' ~ 
the local town and that the fire is burning tmvard the town 
and endangering the people who live there . He can see the 
smoke fron1 the approaching fire and calculates that if he 
burns his neighbor's corn crop he can create a firebrea k th;:lt 
will stem the fire. (Remember that Jak e 's own fi e ld is not . ' 
loca ted \vhere it could serve as a firebreak.) Jake has no 
interc:st in saving the town: the townspeople have always 
been unfr ie nd lv to him. F urth er. Ja l<. e is angrv with his 
- ~ J 
neighbor over a d ispute abo ut use of water from a creek 
that tht:: two share . H e decides to use the fire as an e xcuse 
to burn his neigh bor's corn crop . 'vVithout ask in g his 
neighbor for permission, he burns the fi e lds. The fire 
destroys the entire cro p. B ecause of his quick work the 
town and its inhabitants are saved. 
This scenario is an interesting case because, reca ll from Part LB ., 
most jurisdictions implement the reasons theory by defense 
formulations that require only that the actor "belie ve" that the 
justifying circumstances exist. 54 They do not require that the actor 
act for the just ifying "purpose," even though "purpose" is a standard 
culpability level commonly required by other criminal law doctrines. 
Contrary to the legal rules, which give the same complete 
defense fo r both a just ifica tory purpose and mere knowledge of the 
justifying circumstances, we think the community will find a 
difference be tween the two cases. 'vVe predict th at the person who 
acts for the justificatory p urpose, as in scenario 6, will receive a 
complete defense (no liability), whereas the person who acts knowing 
only of the justifying circumstances but with a purpose other than to 
avoid the greater harm, as in scenario 8, will have som e leve l of 
liability imposed. 
A strict re asons theory might give no defense here . ·while the 
actor knew of the justifying circum.stances, they were not his reason 
for acting. But the reasons theory as adopted in current law treats 
this actor as fu lly justified , thus imposing no liability. 
T he deeds theory would give this actor a significa n t discount 
from full liability , at least as great as that given the unknowingly 
justified actor, because wh ile his mo tive may be bad , his conduct is 
objectively justified. On the other hand, the actor in scenari o 8 at 
least does not think that he is causing a net harm, and therefore we 
54. See supra text accompa nying note 22. 
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think will have less liability than the unknowingly justified actor of 
scenario 7, \vho does think so.55 
T hese first t vvo t ·~s t scenarios p resent variations on the 
unknowingly justified acto r. T he next three scenarios consider the 
reve rse case of the actor \vbo mistaken ly believes he is just ified. T he 
person se tting the fir e thin ks that he has a justification for doing so, 
but h is reasons for thi nking this become increasingty poorly 
gl·otlnded. 
Scena rio~ . Mista i,:c <:.1S to Justification, Reasonab le 
Scenar io 9 prc ~; en t; \he case of a reasonabie mistake <lS to a 
justificat ion: 
Jake hears over his Citizen ·s Band radio that lightn ing has 
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor 's fie lds and 
the loca l town an d that the fi re is burning toward the town 
and endangerin g the people who live there. In t he past, 
Citizen 's Band radio reports have often been true, but also 
often false . Jake stops two cars that are racing into town, 
and both confirm tha t " there is a big, out of control fire, 
heading this way ." (Any reasonable person would think 
there was a destructive fi re coming.) Jake can see the 
smoke from the approaching fire and calculates that if he 
burns his neighbor's corn cro p he can create a firebreak th at 
will stop the fire . (Remember that Jake 's own field is not 
located where it could se rve as a firebreak .) Jake knows 
that his neighbor is no t available to ask for permission, and 
he burns the fields . T he fire destroys the entire crop. It 
turns out that the radio report was in error. The smoke was 
from a con trolled burn being done by a crew of local 
foresters and presen ted no danger to the town or any of the 
surrounding area. 
Both deeds and reasons theories wo uld give a complete defense . 
Only the labeling would be d ifferent. The deeds theory would 
consider the actor excused : the reasons theory would consider the 
actor justified.56 A ll jurisdictions agree that a full defe nse is 
appropriate in this case ; no issue of mitigation arises. Both the deeds 
theory, which we support, and the reasons theory predict no liability. 
55. Reca ll th at the deeds theory reli es upon attempt liabi lity as the source of li ability 
for the unknowingly justified actor. When an actor does not thin k that he is acting 
unjustifiab ly (he knows of th e justify ing circumstances). it is unclear tha t attempt liability 
is approp riate . 
56. See supra text accompa nying notes 22-23 . 
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Scena rio 10. Mistake as to Just ification, l'Jegligent 
Sce nario 10 is a case of a negligent mistake as to a justifica tion, 
differing from scenario 9 as follows: 
In the past, Citizen's B and radio repo; ts bavc often been 
true, but also often fa lse. Jake doc ~;n·t think of th is , and 
a lth ough a reasonable person wc uld do so. Ja ~\:e doesn ' t 
think to check on the truth of the re;:;ort. but the re is no 
doubt in hi s mind that it is a dang ,~r ou:; } s ke can se e 
the smoke from the approaching fire and ca.lcula tes that if 
h ' h. . hb ' ' r: · t ' .e nurns . JS ne1g1 or s corn crop ne c.~n c;·e ::'ttc a .Lire ;reaK 
tha t vvill stop the fire. 
T hose jurisdictions that req u.ire a n:: ::1.sonable m istake for a 
defense , a majority of reasons theory jurisdictions, would deny any 
defense here and would impose full liability, as in scenario l. T he 
jurisdictions that do recognize a mitigation for an unreasonable 
mistake as to a justification, which includes the few deeds 
jurisdictions, will impose m ore liability than the complete defense in 
scenario 6, but notably less than the full liability of scenario 1 that the 
majority view predicts. 
Scenario 11. M istake as to Justification, Reckless 
Scenario 11 is a case of a reckless mistake as to a justification , 
when there is greater culpable state of mind than in scenario 10, but 
the actor still hones tly and sincerely believes that he is acting 
justifiab ly. It differs from scenarios 9 and 10 as foll ows : 
In the past , Citizen 's Band radio reports have often been 
true , but also often false. J ake reme mbers this fact, and 
realizes there might not be a dangerous fire, but doesn't 
check on the truth of the report. He can see the smoke from 
the approaching fire and calculates that if he burns his 
neighbor's corn crop he can crea te a firebreak that wi ll stop 
the fire. 
The majority all-or-nothing approach again would give no 
defense and would impose full liability, as in scenario l. The 
mitigation approach again would give a mitigation fr om full li ability, 
although not as much as the mitigation given in scenario 10. Thus, we 
predict that the liability here will be greater than that in scenario 10, 
but markedly less than that in scenario 1. 
O ur predictions and those consistent with current law are 
summarized in Table 2. G enerally , we think the subjects will agree 
with the predictions of the deeds theory and with mitigations for 
unreasonable mistakes as to a justification. 
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TABLE 2. 
SU!viMARY OF LIA BILITY P REDICTIONS 
CONTRi\ST CASES 
I ------S-ce_· r-1a_r_·io ______ ·--::·,~,~~' ] 
r Tntentional commission I B asclirv~ ~ 
of substantive offense 'j ---r=l ----1 
~ 
2. Attempt 
13. Reckless commission < 1 i 
' 
t 
14. Endangerment < 2 and 3 
~ 5. Attempted endangerment <4 
6. Justified commission No liability 
T EST CASES 
Scenario Our Predictions Predictions Consistent 
(Deeds Theory) wi th Current Law 
(Reasons Theory) 
7. Unknowingly =2 = 1 
justified burning (attempted burning) (no defense; full liability) 
8. Justifying knowledge > 6, but< 7 =6 
without justificatory (complete justification) 
purpose 
9. Reasonable mistake =6 =6 
as to justification (complete excuse) (complete justification) 
(MJ) I 
10. Negligent MJ > 6, but< 1 =1 
(no defense; full liability) 
11. Reckless MJ > 6 and 10, but< 1 = 1 
(no defense; full liability) 
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IV. LIAB ILITY RESULTS 
The mean [~ability for each of the scenarios is set out in Table 3. 
TAB LE3 . 
LlAB!LITY 1VfEANS 
~~=-~~~="=::;~~~·-io=~~~.~~~- ~- Imprisonme nt l 
I · 1 1 1 Mean EqUiva ent " 
~ I 
I Cont rast Cases I l __, 
1. Intentiona l (u njustifi ed) burning 4.65 - 10 months 
2. Attempted (unj ustified) burning 3.52 - 4 months 
3. Created risk o f (unjustified) 2.69 - 6 weeks I burn ing, realized 
4. Created risk of (unjustified) 0.48 essentially I 
burning, unrealized no punishment 
5. Attempted risk creatio n 0.42 essentially 
no punishment 
6. In tentional justified burning 0.57 essentially 
no punishment 
Test Cases I 
7. Unknowingly justified burning 3.63 - 4 months 
8. Knowingly justified burning 2.10 -2 weeks 
but with bad moti ve 
19. Mistake as to justification, reasonable 1.10 - 2 days 
I 10. Mistake as to justification, negligent 2.02 - 2 weeks 
11. Mistake as to justification , reckless 2.33 -4 weeks 
A. The Contrasi Cases 
We begin wi th an examination of the results for the cases that 
were designed to provide comparative information for the test cases. 
The scenario 1 contrast case of intentional burning with no claim of 
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juslification has a lia bility mean of 4.65 (equivalent to about ten 
months imprisonment).57 T his result is what one might expect given 
the nature of the offense , a property offense in which no risk to 
persons is crea ted. 
The scenario 2 contrast , the a ttempt case, has a liability of 3.52 
(just over four months). T his result is co nsistent vvith our expectation 
of substantially reduced punish ment based sole ly on the fortu itous 
absence of the intended harm. Indeed. the ratio of penalties between 
scenarios 1 and 2 is consisten t with those jurisdictions that set the 
grade of an attempt as one grade less than or half the penalty of the 
substan tive offense.58 Recall that on our exponential pena lty scale, 
one unit is equivalent to one offense grade in a typical modern 
American criminal code and tha t each higher grade typically doubles 
the penalty of the previous grade :'i9 
Scenario 3, in which the actor crea tes a risk of burning that is 
realized, has a liability of 2.69 (6.2 weeks). A s predicted, it is less 
than the liability in scenario 1; here the actor does not intend the 
harm, but only risks it. T he importance of this difference in 
culpability level often is reflected by corresponding differences in 
penalties. For example, in homicide cases, this same culpability 
difference results in an intentional killing being punished as murder 
with long-term or life imprisonment or dea th , while a reckless killing 
is punished as manslaughter with a maximum penalty more in the 
range of ten years. 60 
Scenario 4, a case of risk creation in which the harm risked goes 
unrea lized , receives a liabili ty of 0.48, which is essentially no 
punishment (a liability mean of 1.0 is equivalent to one day 
imprisonment). No liability was assigned by 36.5% of subjects. 
A nother 42.3 % gave liability but no punishment. The remaining 
21.2 % gave punishment ranging from one day to six months. The 
deeds theory predicted low liability, from the concurrence of both the 
discount for no resulting harm seen in scenario 2, and the discount for 
lower culpability level seen in scenario 3. We have discussed 
elsewhere this additive nature of different discounts from the full 
57. More precise translation fro m liability means to imprisonment terms can be 
obta in ed by using the tab le in ROB INSON & D ARLEY, supra note 45, app. Cat 283. 
58. See PAUL H. ROBINSON , FUN DAME NTALS OF CRIM INAL LAW 297 (2d ed . 1995) 
(citing statutes). 
59. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
60. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 (2) (1985) (making manslaughter a second 
degree fe lony); id. § 6.06(2) (settin g the maximum term of imprisonment for second 
degree fe lonies at 10 years) . 
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intentional substantive offense .61 The liabi lity result here seems a 
neat accumulation of the 1.1 discount from the full offense seen in 
scenario 2 and the 2.0 discount seen i,n scenario 3. Thus, a perfectly 
additive discount wou ld be 3.1. T he liability result here shows a 3.2 
discount. It seems unlikely , however. that this additive discounting 
always will be quite so neat . This substantial reduction is consistent 
wit h current law's treatment of such matte rs. In homicide, for 
example , creating a ri sk of death th<rt is unrealized is punished 8S 
endangerment, which typically carries a maximum sentence of only 
one year,('2 compared to life imprisonment or death for murder. 
Scenario 5 presents the case of attempted end8ngerment. As 
expected, the liability mean is low, 042. T he result is only slightly 
less than the result in scenario 4 (endangerment), and that small 
difference is not statistically significant. 'We predicted a difference 
be tween the two, with scenario 5 less than scenar io 4, to reflect the 
absence in scenario 5 of the risk that in fact is created in scenario 4. 
Our assumption is that the difference does not appear because the 
scenario 4 liability is already so low no fur ther reduction is possible. 
In scenario 4, 78.8% of the subjects imposed no punishment. That 
leaves little room to distinguish scenario 5 as a case of even less 
blameworthiness. (In scenario 5, 86.5% imposed no punishment.) If 
scenarios with a more serious base offense were used, such as 
homicide , the distinction we expected here might appear. 
Scenario 6, the final contrast case, is an intentional justified 
burning. As expected, it received essentially no punishment. Its 
liability mean was 0.57. No liability was assigned by 38.5% of the 
subjects. Another 40.4% gave liability but no punishment. The 
remaining 21.2% gave punishment ranging from one day to one year. 
This baseline is not as low as we might have guessed but still reflects 
the predicted judgment that the vast majority of subjects see this as a 
case of little or no blameworthiness, despite the fact that an 
intentional harm is caused. 
To summarize the contrast case results , the results came out as 
we predicted. Those predictions, it will be remembered, were based 
on two principles: a liability discount given when the harm risked did 
not actually occur, and a liability discount given as the harm risked 
61. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Objecrivist vs. Subjectivist Views of 
Crim inality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law Theory, 18 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1998). 
62. See, e.g. , MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (making reckless endangerment a 
misdemeanor) ; id. § 6.08 (setting the maxi mum term of imprisonme nt for misdemea nors 
a t o ne year). 
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\Vas altered fro111 ir1tt~n , to reckles s ~ to justified. 
B. T.he C"'ases .for ·vlhiclziFze Tiz ec)ries rJJc.! '"tsrijicali(Ji1 llave Dijjererzt 
Predictions 
The first two test ca'ses exarnine the community's vie·ws on cases 
critical to the d~:e cl s- reason debate . In scenario 7, presenting the 
unkno\vingly justified ::Jctor, the tvvo theo ries predict stark ly diffe rent 
results , and the deeds theory predictions are confirmed. The 
perpetrator in scenario 7 received a liabili ty mean of 3.63 (just over 
four months). This re'suh is not statisticallY differen t from the 
at tempt contrast case in scenario 2, as the deeds theory predicts. 
Such liability is dramatically less than the 4.65 li ability (about ten 
months) for the substantive offense that the reasons theory predicts. 
T he deeds theory is clearly more consistent with community views on 
this rna tter. 
Scenario 8 presents the case of the actor who knows of the 
justifying circumstances but who acts for other, non-justificatory 
motives. Recall that current law would give a complete defense in 
such a case, although logic would seem to suggest that a strict reasons 
theory would give no defense. 63 T he liability mean is 2.10 (2.6 
weeks), not the complete defense that current law would provide-
only 7.8% of our subjects assigned a verdict of no liability-and not 
the full liability that the reasons theory logically would seem to 
suggest. It is consistent, however, with the deeds theory prediction of 
liability being somewhat less than that of the unknowingly justified 
actor. The actor is entitled to at least the discount given the 
unknowingly justified actor because his act is objectively justified; a 
greater harm is in fact avoided. Unlike the unknowingly justified 
actor, however, this actor's liability for attempt is less clear. His 
knowledge of the justifying circumstances may suggest to him that his 
conduct is not in fact criminal, thus he does not have the clear 
intention to violate the law that the unknowingly justified actor has. 
He might be viewed less as breaking the law than as taking advantage 
of it. In any case, the results again are consistent with the deeds view 
and inconsistent with the reasons view. 
Turn next to the three scenarios in which the perpetrator, 
mistakenly believing that the town was in danger of a fire, set his 
neighbor's fields on fire to provide a firebre ak. The reasonableness 
of the mistake varied across these three scenarios. Scenario 9 
presents the case of a reasonable mistake as to a justification. Both 
63. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
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subjects assigned liability of 1.10 (2.3 days), which >vas higher than \;:<:: 
ex pected. Further , only 17.3% gave the complete defense verdict of 
"not guilty." On the other hand, 42.3 % assigned liability but no 
p unishment. Perhaps these subjects \vere concern ed about the 
implicat ions of giving a complete defense in a case in ·vvllich the 
cond uc t in fact is not iustified in an obJ·ective sense. There is reason 
·' 
to think that they should be concerned, as discussed in Section V.C:. 
belo\v. wh ich presents our proposal to revise acquittal verdicts. 
Scen? rios 10 and 11 are cases of unreasonabl e rnistakes as to a 
justificat ion. l n scenario 10, the actor hones tly be lieves bis conduct is 
justified bu t is mistaken, and his mistake is negligent rath.: r than 
reasonable. That is, a re asonable person in the actor's situation 
would have been aware of a risk that the contemplated conduct was 
not justified. In scenario 11, the actor similariy honestly believes his 
conduct is justified and is similarly wrong. But here his mistake is 
more culpable; he is reckless. That is, he is aware of a risk that his 
conduct might not be justified, although, on balance. he concludes 
that it is justified. He disregards the risk (that the conduct might not 
be justified) and proceeds with the conduct. In other words, he 
makes a reckless mistake as to a justification. 
A s expected , the subjects imposed greater liability in these two 
cases than in the case of the reasonable mistake. Further, liability 
was greater in the case of greater culpability in making the mistake: 
2.02 (two weeks) for the negligent mistake, 2.33 (about four weeks) 
:for the reckless mistake. But this range of lia bility is considerably 
less than that imposed by current law's majority rule, which denies 
any defense or mitigation and imposes full subs tantive liability . In 
the context of this burning offense, current law's assignment of no 
defense would give the perpetrator ten months imprisonment, as 
imposed in scenario 1, not the two weeks and four weeks that 
scenarios 10 andll, respectively, actually received. INe conclude that 
the subjects would very much support :ecognition of mitigations for 
unreasonable mistakes as to a justification.64 These results suggest 
64. Reca ll the· correlation in law between the reasons theo ry liability for the 
unknowingly justified actor and the all-or-nothing approach to mistake as to a justification 
(denying a mitigation for an unreasonable mistake as to a justification). See supra text 
accompanying notes 24-28. We reasoned that nothing in the reasons theory logically 
requires adherence to the ali-or-nothing view. Our study results seem to confirm this 
speculation. The persons in our sample cbsest to the reasons theory-those that gave the 
smallest di scounts to the unknowingly justified actor in scenario 7. as against the full 
li ability of scenario 1-were neither significantly higher nor lower in their liability 
assignments in unreasonable mistake scenarios.10 anc\11. than the other subj ects. 
. ., . 
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that the Model Pen al Code 's mitigations of th is sor t should no t have 
been rejecre d so regu la rly by state criminal code drafte rs.65 
V . IlviPLI C:/\T lONS FO R CRIMINAL L AW REFORM 
\Vith t he resul ts current m the reader 's m ind . \Ve turn 
immedia tely to the q ue.:.:t io n of how cr imin al codes m igh t be m odified 
in light of the community intuitio ns rep o r ted here . The re su lts 
renorted in the prev ic) US sect io n confirm that much is r ight in cur rent 
[ . -
cr im in al law fonnu lat. ion. But the r esults also fr equen tly cha llenge 
crim in al code forn1ui at ions and suggest a va ri ety of criminal law 
reforms . T hese a lterati o ns \vo uld involve a reformulat io n of o ffense 
defin it ions. altered fo rmu la tions of what count as defe nses. ancl an 
altered system of tr ia l ve rdicts . 
A. Th e Formulation and G rading of Offenses 
\V hile the study was designe d to examine defenses re late d to 
65. For scenarios 9. 10. and l l. we added one m ore depe nde nt measure that prov ides 
some ill umination of o ur responde nts ' reactions to these scenarios . and perhaps of their 
react ions to other scenari os as we ll. In all of the scenarios in which the neighbor 's fie lds 
actually burned , th ere is one ind ivid ual who is obviously the in noce nt victim of even ts, 
and tha t of course is the neighbor who lost his crop. W e asked respondents "what shoul d 
be cl one" about the neighbor 's loss . A number o f responde nts wro te tha t the ne ighbo r 
sho u ld be compensated for his loss. (Recall th at the instructions made clear that the loss 
was a s ignifi ci:nt one , moving the fa rm fro m a pro fit to a loss.) As the culpab il ity for the 
loss in these cases a lte red . so too did the identity o f the ind ivid uals who owed the 
neighbor compensat io n. When the perpe tr a tor made a reasonab le mistake. respondent s 
thought that the town should share in the task of providing compensat ion. altho ugh the 
perpe trator, who had made the mistake , also owed com pensat ion. When the mistake \vas 
described as negligent, and the n reck less, more of th e respondents thought the burden of 
provid ing compensation fe ll so le ly on the perpetrator, and no t on the townspeople . 
A s we noted befo re. we had expected some judgmen ts of no li ability and instead 
fo und judgments of liab il ity o f a ve ry minor sor t. A n im p ulse toward findi ng 
compensation fo r th e victim may expla in th is differe nce . Testing this possibility, we 
added a question abo ut compe nsa tio n to sce nario 6, in which sett ing fire to the ne ighbor 's 
fiel ds was compiete ly justi fied because it pre vented the oncoming fire from dest roying the 
town. and we gave th is scenario to six new respondents, who first respo nded to the 
compensa tion q uestion and then to the liability question. The responses of these new 
subj ects were q uite revea ling. As to compensati on, all thought compensa ti on was d ue and 
tha t the townsfo lk sh ould be the major source of it. Severa l suggested, as a mo re than 
token gesture of community , that the fa rmer who se t the fire shou ld give some of hi s crop 
to the ne ighbor. V/hether they fe lt that this was "owed" or simply a wi se and neighborl y 
ges ture on th e farm er' s part was no t clea r. After dealing with the compensa ti on iss ue, 
res po ndents fe lt that the qu es tion of li ab ility was moot. P ressed to answer, respondents 
ge ne ra ll y decided tha t " not gui lty" was the appro pria te verd ict. O ne suggested "no 
li abili ty."' What those ve rd icts sugges t is tha t, having required the defendan t to pay some 
compe nsa tion . the respondents thought th a t add ing criminal liabili ty wou ld genera te 
excess ive to tal punishment . 
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justificat ion, the results, speci fically those in the contrast cases, revea l 
something about how the law ought to define offenses . In many 
respects, the results support the general approach of current law. 
A comparison of scenarios 1 and 2 ill ustrates tha t , although the 
actor 's conduct and cul pa ble state of mind are the same in the two 
cases, th e existence of a resulting harm matters greatly in assess ing 
liability and punishment. T his m:tcom e confinTlS find ings in om 
eal-]J. eJ· s tLJrii e" r,r, It p~ov l· c: Ps cri·o ;Jr··dc: '···. ( ·;· i t i' r :i ? P th P """1.11"-,-l.tv of s··ra·te ...._._ u. l • _, b • J.- - ~~ l \. 1 · ....... ~. L - '- ·~- -~ -""" .t ... l V1. 1... .; ~ 
criminal codes that follow the Model .Pen al Code in grading attempts 
the same as the substJntive offen se.67 The Code ·would have graded 
<... 
the offenses in scena rios 1 and 2 the same. but our S1Jbjects gave the 
attempt less th an half of the punishmen t of the completed offense. 
A comparison of the results in scenarios 1 and 3, as well as in 
scenarios 2 and 4, confirms current lmv'::; view that the actor 's 
culpab ility level o ught to have a larg·:: effect on degree of liability. 
Again, these findings are consistent with the findin gs in differe nt 
contexts found in our previous studies.68 Intentionally causing or 
trying to ca use a harm is dramatically more blameworthy than being 
reckless as to causing the same harm. This norm supports current 
law's grading of offenses according to culpability level, as in 
homicide-intentional killing (rimrder) is graded more seriously than 
reckless killing (manslaughter) . 
But given the near universali ty of this rule , it also m ay be 
appropriate to criticize current law for limiting the use of culpability 
levels in grading to a few serious offenses. T he results suggest that an 
actor 's culpability level is significan t in offenses far less serio us than 
homicide. Even in the pure property offenses tes ted here , the effect 
of culpability level was dramatic . The intent ional burning received 
more than seven times the punishment of the reckless burning. 69 
Each point on our liability scale is equivalent to approximately one 
grade in a modern A merican criminal code . T hus, if the results here 
were followed, reckless burning would be graded two grades less than 
intentional burning. Current law, in contrast, typically grades 
intentional and reckless (and negligent) burning the same .70 
66. Sec ROB INSON & DARLEY, supm note 45. at st udies 1. 17. 
67. See, e.g. , M ODEL PENAL CODE ~ 5.05(1): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-51 
(West 1971) ; N .J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4(a) (West 1978) ; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 905(a) (Wes t 1972 & Supp. 1997) . 
68. See ROB!NSON & D ARLEY, supra no te 45. at s tu d ies 8, 9, 16. 
69. Compare scenario 1's ten m o nths to scen ar io 3's six weeks . 
70. See, e.g., M ODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(1 )(a) . G rading d iffere nces are based 
exclusive ly on the value of the property damaged. See id. § 220.3(2) . 
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B. The Formulation of Defenses 
The results in the contrast cases also tell us son1ething about 
defenses. A comparison of the results in scenarios l and 6 shows 
clearly that a "lesser evils defense ,,. as it is called , has strong intuitive 
support among the subjects. A p lain language version of the defense 
might read like this: "Yo u may act in a way that would otherwise be 
a crime if your conduc t is necessary to avoid a more se rious harm or 
evil than that caused by yo ur conduct. "71 About ha lf of American 
iurisdictions do not vet recognize such a defense .72 and manv of those 
.J " :._.- ..1 
that have recognized the fense in one case or another have 
declined to codify it, leaving its availability and formulation in 
doubt. 73 The strength of intuit ive support for the defense suggests 
that it ought to be fo rmally recognized through codification 
everywhere. 
The five test cases offer the most inmortant new information 
< 
with implications for criminal law reform . A s noted in the previous 
section , the results in scenario 7, as compared to scenarios 1 and 2, 
suggest that the unknowingly justified actor ought to be treated as an 
attempter, not as a perpetrator of a full substantive offense. H e has 
in fact avoided a greater harm; there is no net harm. A n objective 
formulation of justification defenses, like the one quoted in the 
paragraph above, would achieve this result, for it would give a 
justification defense to the unknowingly justified actor, who would 
then be liable only for attempt under a provision like the Model 
Penal Code's: "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission 
of the crime, he purposely engages in conduct which would constitute 
the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to 
be .... "74 Under the circumstances as the unknowingly justified 
actor believes them to be, he is committing the crime; hence, he is 
liable for an attempt to commit the crime. 
In addition to justification defenses objectively defined, the law 
must provide a defense provision governing mistake as to a 
justification that would give a defense to the actor who mistakenly 
believes her conduct is justified. The results of scenario 8, as 
compared to scenario 6, suggest that such a provision should be 
71. Paul H. Robinson et al., ivfaking Criminal Codes Functional: A Code of Conduct 
and a Code of Adjudication, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 304 app. A. § 67, at 344 
(1996). 
72. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3. § 124. at 45 n.l (citing authorities). 
73. See 2 id. 
74. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 5.0l(l)(a). 
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formulated to give a comple te defense only if the actor acts for the 
justificatory purpose; it ought not be enough that she simply knows of 
the justifying circumstances, if these were not her renson for acting. 
As noted above, only 7.8% of our subjects gave a defense to an actor 
who knew of the justifying circumstances but acted out for a 
different, malevolent motive . This resul t suggests that a complete 
defen se o ught to be given not when an actor '·believes her conduct is 
necessa ry to avoid a threatened grea ter harm ,"' bu t on ly when she 
engages in the offense conduct "in order ru avoid a threate ned 
o-1·e ::> t , .. r 11 ·· 1' '11 ., b .LL C_ l.cl . t . 
The question remains, however , whether such an increased 
defense rr:quirement has practical utility. It is not impossible , but 
certair'.ly d ifficult , for a court to know wheth er an actor acts for the 
proper purpose. An actor who knows of the justifying circumstances 
generally would have little difficulty persuading a court that those 
circumstances are the source of her motivation . Further, the case in 
which the justificatory purpose is not present, as in scenario 8, will be 
rare . A ll things considered , it may not be worth the trouble to have 
the defense formulation distinguish between purpose and simple 
bel ief. 
T he real dispute in formulating the mistake-as-to-a-justification 
defense is whether to allow a mitigation for an unreasonable mistake . 
As noted above , the results in scenarios 10 and 11 show that our 
subjects give a significant mitigation in such cases from the full 
liability given in scenario 1. The current law's majority rule , then , is 
badly out of step with our subjects' views. In the case of a reckless 
mistake, our subjects would give one-tenth the liability given fo r the 
fu ll offense. 75 For a negligent mistake, our subj ects would give one-
twentieth of that for the full offense.76 These are substantial 
mitigations, in cases in which current law commonly gives none. 
How might code drafters incorporate this mitigation approach 
into defenses for mistake as to a justification? The basic defense 
might read something like the following: "An actor is excused for 
her conduct constituting an offense if her conduct would be justified 
had the attendant circumstances been as she believed them to be. " 
The effect of this provision would be to provide a mistake-as-to-a-
justification excuse to a person who honestly believed her conduct to 
be justified. Another provision would then impose liability upon 
those actors whose mistakes were culpable , varying the level of 
75. Compare resu lts of scenarios 1 and 11. 
76. Compare resul ts of scenarios 1 and 10. 
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liability \vith the level of culpability of the mistake. 77 Such a 
provision might provide: "When an actor is reckless or negligent in 
assessing the circumstances that justify her conduct. the mistake-as-
to-a-justification excuse [quoted above] is not available for an offense 
for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be. is sufficient 
to establish liability. " 7 ~' Thus, a person who intentionally kills another 
believing that such killing is justified but who is reckless in having 
such a belief. would be liable only for reck less homicide 
(manslaughter), not intentional homicide (murder) . A person vvho is 
negligent in so believing would be liable only for negligent 
homicide. 79 
C. Reform ofAcquittal Verdict Forms 
Recall the peculiar results in scenario 9, in which the actor 
makes an entirely reasonable mistake, is blameless, and few subjects 
imposed any significant punishment, yet only 17.3% gave the actor a 
defense. If the subjects thought that no punishment is appropriate, 
why would they impose liability? 
One argument made in support of the deeds theory is that it 
helps make a distinction that is important to effective operation of 
criminal justice: the distinction between (1) conduct not punished 
because it is the right thing to do, it avoids a greater harm, and we 
would want it to be performed under similar circumstances in the 
future, and (2) conduct not punished because, vvhile it is wrong, it 
does not avoid a greater harm, and we would not vvant it pe rformed 
in similar circumstances in the future, the actor in fact is blameless 
for performing the wrongful conduct. Recall from the introduction 
of this Article that this is the classic distinction between a 
justification and an excuse. The deeds theory allows this distinction 
to be made manifest by distinguishing cases of mistake as to a 
77. This is the structural approach of the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 3.09(2). 
78. This language is modeled after Model Penal Code § 3.09(2). See id. It suffers 
from a number of technical problems that arc beyond the scope of this Article. See 
ROBINSON, supra note I, at 463-64 (discussing these technical problems). 
79. Unfortunately, this approach to drafting a mitigation provision is dependent upon 
the criminal code having different culpability levels for most offenses. That is a 
suggestion that we urge above. but it is not true of most modern criminal codes. When no 
lesser grade for a lower culpability existed, the actor would get a complete defense under 
this approach , even for a reckless mistake. That would be a very undesirable result. 
Another approach. not dependent on the proper structuring of offense definitions. would 
give a set mitigation (for example, one offense grade-for a reckless mistake) and a 
greater mitigation (two offense grades) for a negligent mistake. 
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justification from cases of objective justificacion. labeling the former 
excuses and only the iatter justifications. 
Under this approach, an actor acquitted under a justification 
defense provides an example to others of conduct that they are free 
to repeat in similar circumstances in the future. An actor excused 
under a mistake-as-to-a-justification excuse . in contrast, provides an 
example to others of cond uct that they ought not perform in similar 
circumstances in the future. The actor is being acquitted despite her 
wrongful conduct. The reasons theory. by combining truly justified 
conduct wi th mistak e as to a jLtstification. te rming both "justified," 
makes it impossible to rnake this distinction. 
This tension benveen judging the actor and judging the act may 
well have influenced our subjects in scenario 9, in which 71.2% gave 
the actor essentially no punishment-either no liability, liability but 
no punishment, or one clay imprisonment, which might have been 
seen as a symbolic gesture. 81 1 If no punishment is the strong majority 
view of the group, why did only 17.3% give the complete defense 
verdict of "not guilty," thus imposing no liability at all? They may 
well have been concerned about the precedential effect of such 
outright acquittals, the message that it would send to others. Would 
it be taken to weaken the prohibition against such burnings 
generally? 
That is certainly a danger in a system like the current one, which 
does not distinguish betvveen justified conduct, which the law is 
happy to have repeated by others in similar circumstances. and 
excused conduct, which the law does not want repeated. Both cases 
are acquitted under current practice with the same verdict, "not 
guilty." If the only choice available is "not guilty," with no 
justification or excuse distinction, jurors are likely to feel 
uncomfortable acquitting in cases of excuse, for fear of the ease with 
which the verdict can be misunderstood. On the other hand, they 
also would fe el uncomfortable exposing a person they thought 
blameless to substantial punishment with a "guilty" verdict. 81 
We offered our subjects a way out of this dilemma, and they 
embraced it. They were offered a choice of "liability but no 
punishment," which gave them the opportunity to avoid punishing a 
blameless actor but also to condemn the conduct as something that 
80. Of all the subjects, 86.5% fit into these three categories for the contrast case of 
actual justified burning. 
81. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE ;\ND FUNCnm.,: IN CRIMINAL LAW 146-48 
(1997). 
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While this approetch is ci usefu l research device and has revealed 
interesting informa rion, H is no c a solution to the practical problem in 
real life, for juries have little role in the sentencing process. Once 
they give a verdict of ' ' li ability" of any sort, it is for the court to 
sentence. T he offense -v hich the jury convicts sets a statutory 
maximum above '>Nhi :s entencing judge cannot go. but, unless 
they give a defense. cannot othervvise assure that the actor will 
get no punishment or on syrnbolic punishment , as our study allows 
its subjects . F urthel·. " liability bm no punishment" option has the 
disadvantage of imposing · bility on a blameless defendant. 1n the 
real world, where crimi conviction can bring moral condemnation 
and stigmatization, as well as other collateral disadvantages in jobs, 
licensing, and the iike, such li ability is unfair. Thus, even if jurors had 
sentencing power, this solution to the problem-liability with no 
punishment-has the effect of imposing the condemnation and 
stigma of criminal conviction on a blameless offender who does not 
deserve it. vVe force jurors between the two bad choices of doing 
injustice or undermining the prohibition against such conduct in the 
future. 
The better resolution is to recognize formally distinct acquittal 
verdicts of "justified" and "excused," in which the former approves of 
the actor's conduct and the latter disapproves of it. An objectively 
justified actor receives a verdict of "justified," thereby approving of 
the conduct, while the actor •.vho mistakenly believes she is justified is 
"excused," thereby disapproving of the conduct. One of us has 
elsewhere offered the dewils for such a verdict system.s2 
V I. CONCLUSIONS 
The results reported here illustrate the potential usefulness of 
social science research for illuminating iss ues concerning the 
formulation of criminal codes . If the code drafters are interested in 
knowing the moral intuitions of the community that the codes will 
govern, then the sort of careful, empirical social science study of the 
sort conducted here is the oreferred mechanism for discovering those 
> '--' 
intuitions. Properly constructed studies can resolve competing claims 
among criminallav.; theoris ts over which theory or rule better accords 
with people's intuitions of justice. H ere we conclude that the deeds 
theory of justification better accords with community views than does 
the reasons theory. 
S2. See id. at 204-07. 
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Further. such st udies also 2:enerate soecific r::::form Drocosals that 
~ .._ J J, 
would ma ke the criminal justice system more just in its ope ration. 
T he re sults in this study sugges t a reformul ation of many aspects of 
offense defini tions, reforms to justification defenses and mitiga tions 
for mistake as to a justifica tion , and reforms of j ury acquittal verdicts. 
O n our examin ation, and, we hope, on the re ader 's exa mination, 
these suggest ions for reform appear cohere nt and are ones that 
adequate ly balance the competing considera tions that govern 
judgments about these difficult cases in which the rt~ason for c.nd the 
outcome of the perpetrator 's acts are in con flict. T hey are, in other 
\vords. reasonable candidates fo r code adop tion . Reforms of this 
sort, that bring crimin al law's principles of justice closer to those of 
the community, we argue, increase the law·s moral credibili ty , which 
in turn increases its long-term effectiveness in crime control. 
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APPENDIX: STEviULUS STORIES 
As we all know, in different circumstances, some actions can 
generate crirninal liabili ty while very similar o th ers do not. Below 
are a number of cases in which a person se ts a fire, for a number of 
different reasons , and under a number of diffe rent circumstances. 
Your task is to judge wh e the r the act , in each of the speci fi e stories 
that you read, should co unt as an offense generating crimina l !iJbility 
Dr not. If vou decide th at it is a offense that shou ld g:e ne r <1te liabilitv. 
,) ._., ., ' 
you will then assign it a punishment of whatever magnitude mak es 
sense to you, or you may decide that even though it is a criminai act , 
you want to assign it n o punishment. 
Here is hov; you will register your judgments. You \.vill z:t!ways 
make your judgment by responding to the scale that we furnish below 
each case . Glance at the sample scale just belO\.V this paragraph now. 
After yo u read a specific scenario . circle "N" if yo u think the person 
has committed something that ordinarily would be considered a 
crime , but he has an acceptable justification fo r what he did and so 
should get no criminal liability. Circle "0" if you think the person 
has done something that generates criminal li a bility but should not 
receive any punishment. Otherwise choose a sentence from the other 
o ptions. vVork thro ugh the set of cases , giving us your opinions-
there are no right answers. Take as much time as yo u need to go 
through the set of cases. (The numbers in front of each scenario are 
random, and simply te ll us the source of the scenario. Ignore them .) 
Background Information for all of the scenarios. 
Jake is a farmer who has already harves ted his corn crop. His 
neighbor has not done so, so his three acres of corn is still in the 
fie lds. The corn crop ma kes the differe nce, for these farmers. 
between having a profitable season because they have winter feed for 
their animals , or going into debt. 
Running around seve ral sides of I ake a nd his neighbor 's fields 
are dirt roads. Jake ·s farm and his neighbor's farm are on a neck of 
land that stretches out into a lake. Out on the end of the neck of land 
is the local town. Jake's neighbor's fi e lds cut the tovvn off from the 
mainland, but Jake's fie lds do not. The following map shows you this 
layout. 
(See FIGURE 1.] 
Now read the stories. Please circle the rating that corresponds 
with YOUR OPINION about what the appropriate sentence (if any) 
sho uld be for Jake in each case. These cases will differ slightly , so it 
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is important that you read the entire case before making a judgment 
about sentencing. If you think that the difference between two 
scenarios is important, you shouid assign different amounts of 
punishment to Jake as a result of that difference. But you may find 
some differences between scenarios to be unimportant, in terms of 
the amount of punishment, and it is quite all right if you assign them 
the same amount of punishment. 
Some people have trouble thinking about punishments in terms 
of prison sentences. Our real question to you is what punishment 
Jake deserves for the act he committed, using the scale as a vehicle to 
express your beliefs. So you may want to think about the amount of 
punishment you think the act deserves as equivalent to a prison 
sentence of a particular length, and then assign that length sentence. 
For example, you may think a two-week prison sentence is equivalent 
to a $10,000 fine, and hence circle a "2" to indicate that relative 
amount of punishment. 
After reading and assigning a sentence to a later case, you might 
want to change your punishment ratings of one or more previous 
cases. You are free to do so. Remember, we are interested in 
knowing the liability and sentence YOU THINK SHOULD BE 
ASSIGNED in each case: there are no right and wrong answers and 
your responses will be kept completely confidential. 
1. Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of 
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that his 
neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three acres of corn. 
Because the field is bounded on all sides by dirt roads, and there is no 
wind, it is clear that the burning will create no danger beyond that of 
destroying the corn. The fire destroys the entire crop. 
N 4 10 11 
no liJb. liab. 1 clay 2 wks 2 mo 6 mo 1 yr 3 yr 7 yr 15 yr 30 yr life death 
but no imprison-
punish. mcnt 
2. Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of 
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that his 
neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three acres of corn. 
Because the field is bounded on all sides by dirt roads, and there is no 
wind, it is clear that the burning will create no danger beyond that of 
destroying the corn. Just as Jake sets the fire, the neighbor 
I 
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unexpectedly returns and puts it out before it does any harm. 
10 il 
no liab. liab. 1 day .2 wb 2 mu 6 111\l l yt 3 yr 7 yr 15 yr ::;u yr life dea th 
hut no impn son-
puni::;h. mcn t 
3. Like all of the local farmers. Jake routinely piles dry 
cornhusks near where the y Z~re cut and eventually burns them. Jake 
has one such pile near his neighbor"s fields. Jake wants to get the pile 
burned quickly; the previous yea r he waited and the pile got soaked 
by rain. H e is aware that high winds are forecast for today; winds 
that create a real risk that his fir e will jump the gap between his trash 
pile and his neighbor 's corn fi elds. Despite this danger, Jake burns 
his trash pile, hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor's crop. 
The winds come and the fire jumps to his neighbor's crop. The fire 
destroys the entire crop. 
N 0 10 11 
no liab. liab. 1 day 2 wk s 2 m o f) nw 1 yr :- \T 7 yr 15yr 30yr !if~ death 
but no imprison-
punish. mcnt 
4. Like all of the local farmers, Jake routinely piles dry 
cornhusks near where they are cut and eventually burns them. Jake 
has one such pile near his neighbor's fields. Jake wants to get the pile 
burned quickly; the previous year he waited and the pile got soaked 
by rain. He is aware that high winds are forecast for today; winds 
that create a real risk that his fire will jump the gap between his trash 
pile and his neighbor's corn fields. Despite this danger, Jake burns 
his trash pile, hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor's crop. 
The winds come but, Jake is lucky, the fire does not jump to his 
neighbor's crop. 
N 0 111 11 
no liah. liab. 1 day 2 wks 2 mo ri mu l yr 3 yr 7 YT 15 yr 3U yr life death 
but no imprison-
punish. mcnt 
5. Like all of the local farmers, Jake routinely piles dry 
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cornhusks near where they are cut and eventually burns them. J ake 
has one such pile near his neighbor's fields. Jake ·wants to get the pile 
burned quickly: the previous year he waited and the pile got soaked 
by rain. He is aware that high winds are fo recast for today: winds 
that create a real risk that his fire will jump the gap be tween his trash 
pile and his neighbor's corn fields. Despite th is danger, Jake burns 
his trash pile , hoping the fire will not jump to his m;ighbor's crop. It 
turns out that the weather forecast was in ::rror about the wind . 
Jake's burning never creates any danger to his neighbor's field. 
N () lll ll 
no !iah. li <tb. i Ua: ~ '-vks 2 mo 6 mu l yr 3 y1 I yr 15 yr 30 yr iifc de a th 
butnu imprison~ 
puni~h . rilent 
6. Jake hears over his Citizen 's Band radio that lightning has 
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor 's fie lds and the local 
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and endangering 
the people who live there. He can see the smoke from the 
approaching fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor's corn 
crop he can create a firebreak that will stop the fire . (Remember that 
Jake 's own field is not located where it could serve as a firebreak.) 
J ake knows that his neighbor is not available to ask for permission, 
and he burns the fields. The fire destroys the entire crop. Because of 
his quick work the town and its inhabitants are saved. 
N II ~ lO ll 
no !iab. iiab. I clay 2 wks 2 mo 6 mo 1 yr 3 yr 7 ~ r 15 yr 30 yr life denth 
but no imprison-
punish. ment 
7. Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of 
water from a creek that the two share. Vv'hen he knows that his 
neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three acres of corn. 
Because the field is bounded on all sides by dirt roads, it is clear that 
the burning will create no danger beyond that of destroying the 
neighbor's corn. The fire destroys the entire crop. Unbeknown to 
Jake, lightning has started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor 's 
fields and the local town and the fire is burning toward the town and 
endangering the people who live there. H is burning the field creates 
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a firebreak: The town and its inhabitants are saved. 
0 111 11 
no li ah . lio1b 1 day 2 wks 2 mo 6 1110 l yr 3 yr 7 yr 15 yr 30 yr life 
but no imprison -
puni-;.h. mcnt 
8. Jake hears ove r his C itizen ·s Band radio that lightn in g bas 
:)tarted a fire upwind from his and his ne ighbor's fields and the local 
town ancl that the fire is burning toward the town and endangering 
the people who live there. He can see the smo ke from the 
approaching fire and calcu lates that if he burns his neighbor' s corn 
crop he can create a firebreak that will stop the fire. (Remember that 
Jake 's own field is no t loca ted where it could serve as a firebreak.) 
Jake has no interest in saving the town ; the townspeople have always 
been unfriendly to him. Further , Jake is angry with his neighbor over 
a dispute about use of water from a creek that the two share. He 
decides to use the fire as an excuse to burn his neighbor's corn crop. 
Without asking his neighbor for permission, he burns the fields. The 
fire destroys the entire crop. Because of his quick work the town and 
its inhabitants are saved. 
N 0 6 8 9 10 11 
no 1iab. liab. I day ?: wks 2 mo n mo I yr 3 yr 7 y r 15 yr 30 vr lift: d~.: ath 
but no imprison -
punish . ment 
9. Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that lightning has 
sta rted a fire upwind from his and his neighbo r's fie lds and the local 
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and endangering 
the people who live there. In the past , Citizen's Band radio reports 
have often been true, but also often false. Jake stops two cars tha t 
are racing into town, and both confirm that " there is a big, out of 
control fire, heading this way." (Any reasonab le person would think 
there was a destructive fire coming.) Jake can see the smoke from 
the approaching fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor 's 
corn crop he can create a firebreak that will stop the fire . 
(Remember that Jake's own field is not loca ted where it could serve 
as a firebreak.) Jake knows that his neighbor is not available to ask 
for permission, and he burns the fields. T he fire destroys the en tire 
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crop. It turns out that the radio report was in error. The smoke \Vas 
from a con trolled burn being clone by a crew of local foresters and 
presented no danger to the town or any of the surrounding area. 
0 Ill II 
no liab. li:-1h. i d :ly 2 wks 2 mo () mo 1 yr 3 yr 7 yr l.Syr 30 yr life 
btlt !Hl impri son-
pu n i~h m~nt 
10. Jake hears over his Citize n's Band radio that lightning has 
started a fire upwin d from his and hi s neighbor's fields and th e local 
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and end angering 
the people who live th ere. In the past, Citizen's Band radio reports 
have often been true. but also often false. J ake doesn ' t think of this, 
and although a reasonable person would do so, Jake doesn't think to 
check on the truth of the report , but there is no doubt in his mind 
that it is a dangerous fire. Jake can see the smoke from the 
approaching fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor 's corn 
crop he can create a fire break that will stop the fire . (Remember that 
Jake 's own fi eld is not located where it could serve as a firebreak .) 
Jake knows that his neighbor is not available to ask for permission, 
and he burns the fi elds. The fire destroys the entire crop. It turns out 
that the radio report was in error. The smoke was from a controlled 
burn being clone by a crew of local for esters and presented no danger 
to the town or any of the surrounding area. 
N ] I) II 
no liab. l iab . I clay 2 \\'ks ::! mo 6 mo 1 yr 3 yr 7 yr l )yr 30yr li fe death 
b Ul ll O imprison-
pun ish mcnt 
11. Jake hears over his Citizen 's Band radio that lightning has 
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and the local 
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and endangering 
the people wh o live there. In the past , Citizen's Band radio reports 
have often been true , but also often false. Jake remembers this fact , 
and realizes there might not be a dangerous fire, but doesn't check on 
the truth of th e report. He can see the smoke from the approaching 
fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor 's corn crop he can 
create a fire break th at will stop the fire. (Remember that Jake's own 
I 
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fie ld is not located where it could serve as a firebreak .) Jake knows 
that his neighbor is not avail able to ask for pe rmission, and he burns 
the fie lds. The fire destroys the entire crop. It turns out that the 
radio report was in error. The smoke was from a controlled burn 
being done by a crew of loca l fores ters and presented no danger to 
th e town or any of th e surro unding area. 
(I J (l II 
no !iJb. li :-tb. I cb y ::! ,,-ks ~ mn r, nw ! '.T _; yr 7 yr 15 yr 30 yr life dclth 
b ut no ! rnpr ! ..; (nl -
punish. mcnt 
